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ABSTRACT

This research project will examine the concept of sovereignty in Vermont for the
years 1750-1791. As with most conceptual studies, it is necessary to first examine the
history of the concept. I begin with René Descartes (1596-1650), and his reconceptualization of Man in a natural state. It is my contention that his metaphysical and
ontological findings in Meditations on First Philosophy (1641) were then adopted by
Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) in Leviathan (1651), and John Locke (1632-1704) in Two
Treatises of Government (1689). Basing their philosophies on Descartes’s “revised”
depiction of Man in nature, both Hobbes and Locke envisioned a Man who naturally made
both rational and passionate decisions, as communities transitioned, via the process of
government formation, from the state of nature into the state of “civil society,” as they
termed it. Contemporaneous with this theoretical evolution was the inclusion of “the
people’” in British governance through the rise of Parliament at the turn of the seventeenth
century. Juxtaposed with real events, the philosophers’ reconceptualization demonstrates
an evolving concept of sovereignty in the British state. By the time of the American
Revolution, the concept of popular sovereignty was born, and “the people” ascended in
both political theory and political reality.
Because the eighteenth-century concept of sovereignty was based heavily on the
metaphor of the state of nature, I chose the inhabitants of the New Hampshire Grants as a
case study. These residents believed they resided in something close to a literal state of
nature from 1760-1777, and that they had lived the theoretical philosophies of Hobbes,
Locke, and other contemporary theorists. Once the theoretical description of a natural state
is juxtaposed with the socio-political history of the Grants region, it is clear that inhabitants
believed the Colony of New York, the appendage of the British state which claimed
authority in the region, did not provide efficient governance for the residents. After the
American Revolution broke out, Grants residents claimed it was their natural right to erect
a state and systematically replace New York. Once Vermont’s constitution went into effect
in 1778, the concept of sovereignty was expressed in response to two simultaneous
processes: the first, the geo-political stabilization of the state in the midst of both war and
constant challenges to the state’s existence; the second, the Vermont people transforming
from a blend of “Yorkers” and “Yankees” into Vermonters. Both of these processes were
complete by the mid-1780s as surrounding states and former Yorkers grew to accept the
legitimacy of Vermont. By the late 1780s, as the United States Constitutional Convention
was underway, Vermont was no longer considered a “pretended state,” and was able to
face the convention on its own terms, representing its own sovereign people.
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INTRODUCTION
As early as the thirteenth century the word “sovereignty” was attached to the
notion of ultimate authority, or supreme rule. By the seventeenth century, it was
understood that a source must have enough power to enforce its will and establish its
position in society as sovereign. This supreme power was not without its own code of
ethics, however, and the job taken on by many seventeenth-century political philosophers
was to define the sovereign’s duties and terms of engagement with both the people and
other sovereign states. The “state of nature” was a metaphorical phrase commonly found
in the methodology of political philosophers who believed its usage illuminated features
of pure and ideal governments. Thomas Hobbes and John Locke are examples of two
prominent political philosophers who wrote (arguably) their most influential works on
the natural creation of government. This project will juxtapose the socio-political history
of Vermont’s tumultuous infancy within the conceptual framework provided by
Leviathan and Two Treatises of Government.
An introduction into the state of nature and its relationship to the creation of a
sovereign state, as it was understood in Vermont during the Revolutionary period, is
clearest when considering Thomas Jefferson’s remarks on the Green Mountains’
inhabitants. Rather than use the phrase “state of nature” as it was understood
metaphorically by Jefferson and his contemporaries (including Hobbes and Locke), the
people of Vermont spoke about their literal experience in a “state of nature” as a
justification for creating a government.

1

In his 1783 letter to Edmund Randolph, Jefferson neglected to consider the actual
experiences of Vermont residents when discussing Vermont’s relationship to the state of
nature metaphor. Jefferson first commented on a “doctrine of the most mischievous
tendency” which had appeared in an act passed by the Virginia Assembly in December
1782.1 The legislation stated that loyalist refugees and merchants who sought to claim
debts in Virginia ought not to be allowed to return, even under a flag of truce. The
legislation, Jefferson commented, “stands on its best ground…on the reasonableness of
a mutual risk in all contests…if we staked everything and they nothing.” But there was
more to the resolution, Jefferson continued:
Not content with this they go on to talk of the dissolution of the social contract
on a revolution of government, and much other little stuff by which I collect their
meaning to have been that on changing the form of our government all our laws
were dissolved, and ourselves reduced to a state of nature. This is precisely the
Vermont doctrine.
Jefferson believed that the Virginia colonists, like the Vermonters, confused the
independence movement with the “dissolution of the social contract.” “The term social
contract” was itself a theoretical one, he argued, but if “forced into practical use,” the
“contract” must apply to the people themselves and every individual law they lived under
during the former government. He summarized his argument with a metaphor: “If you
and I have a contract of six articles and agree to amend two of them, this does not dissolve
the remaining four.” Why, Jefferson asked, would removing British laws such as “the

1

Thomas Jefferson to Edmund Randolph, 2/15/1783, National Archives, “Founders Online,”
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/, last accessed 2/12/2017. The historians that
work on the National Archives “Founders Online” transcriptions include meticulous footnotes
that describe and quote the Virginia resolves.
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mode of appointing judges” affect “another law which had said that on the death of a
father his eldest son shall inherit his lands?” The point here is that Jefferson mistakenly
equated the claim advanced in this Virginia legislation--that colonists resided in a
theoretical “state of nature”--with a very different use of the term coming from the Green
Mountains.2 Although Jefferson labelled this idea “precisely the Vermont doctrine,” it
only partially reflected the Vermont experience.
The “state of nature” phrase was used in similar ways by both Vermonters and
the residents of other colonies in the sense that both groups used it to justify their new
governments. But as Jefferson argued, the real “state of nature” could only come about
if “all our laws were dissolved,” a claim he further justified with his metaphor. To him,
a state of nature could exist only in a situation of complete lawlessness, which he argued
no colonist experienced in reality. Many residents of the Hampshire Grants, however,
did believe they were experiencing a period of complete lawlessness in the sense that
state civil institutions were unrealistically distant, protection was hardly protective, and
worst of all in the eyes of these inhabitants (thanks to Locke), one’s property was
constantly threatened. The concept of sovereignty in Vermont has eluded historians for
the past two centuries.

2

Peter Onuf does consider the “Vermont doctrine” and its appeal to the rhetoric of the colonies.
Even Ethan Allen stated that “legally speaking,” Vermont remained under the sovereignty of the
British state. But as I mentioned previously, one should not discuss the realm of legality alone
when examining the concept of sovereignty. See “State Making in Revolutionary America:
Independent Vermont as a Case Study” in The Journal of American History Vol. 67, no. 4 (Mar.,
1981), pp. 797-815; 804.

3

While the use of natural right rhetoric in Vermont during the Revolutionary era
has been noted by historians, seldom has it received a specific analysis that places
Vermont within a transcontinental intellectual framework. Peter Onuf, a leading scholar
of eighteenth-century intellectual thought, performs an erudite legal analysis of early
Vermont (called the “Hampshire Grants” before 1777). He spends little time on natural
law discourse, however, because he concludes that Vermonters formulated contradictory
arguments of natural rights; they spoke as if they were experiencing a “state of nature,”
but were at no point really in that state. Instead, Onuf argues, they resided in “extra
provisional” land, and within such “crown lands” the king’s authority was still absolute.3
Kevin Graffagnino followed this line of argument a few years later, suggesting that
Vermont residents could claim to be “in a state of nature” only after the Green Mountain
Boys “dismantled New York’s structure of government east of the Hudson.”4
Graffagnino acknowledges, rightly I believe, that the claim to being in a state of nature
in Vermont was related to “New York’s failure to rule effectively with a functioning and
responsible court system, representative legislature, and wartime administration,” but
does not spend much time on the history of the nature claim.

3

Peter Onuf, 802-5. “State Making” is a short article synthesized from his book The Origins of
the Federal Republic: Jurisdictional Controversies in the United States, 1775-1787,
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1983); for “extra provisional” quote, Origins of
the Federal Republic, 133.
4
Kevin J. Graffagnino, “The Country My Soul Delighted in”: The Onion River Land Company
and the Vermont Frontier” in The New England Quarterly, vol. 65, no.1 (March 1992), pp. 2460; 37.
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Nicholas H. Muller III and Michael Bellesiles have done the most for early
Vermont political historiography, but from very different perspectives. Muller was hired
as a history professor at the University of Vermont in 1966, and has been largely involved
in most of the major historical studies of Vermont since that time. He was in the vanguard
of a revisionist movement in Vermont historiography that warned researchers to be
careful about exaggerating Ethan Allen’s role in early Vermont. In addition, Muller has
also played a major role in re-conceptualizing the political philosophy of Vermont’s
founders.5 Undermining the longstanding belief in Vermont’s democratic egalitarianism
is no simple task (and it is certainly not the aim of this study), and Muller has done an
impressive job in at least destabilizing it. The complexity of the political and intellectual
culture of early Vermont is described in Bellesiles’ monumental work, Revolutionary
Outlaws: Ethan Allen and the Struggle for Independence on the Early American Frontier.
This is a well-researched analysis of politics in early Vermont, but as the title suggests,
Bellesiles’s study is primarily on the history of early Vermont from the perspective of
one individual, Ethan Allen. Bellesiles makes the provocative claim that “the Revolution
placed all Americans in a state of nature,”6 but does not spend much time exploring the
concept in depth. In Vermont historiography, scholars have agreed that Vermonters

5

See John J. Duffy and Nicholas H. Muller III, Inventing Ethan Allen (Hanover: University Press
of New England, 2014). Also, Muller’s call in his “Giving Form to Vermont’s History: The
Challenge for the Future” for scholars to “approach and understand the Vermont experience in
larger regional, national, international, and increasingly, global terms,” was influential for this
project, 105, https://vermonthistory.org/journal/71/vt711_210.pdf.
6
	
  Michael A. Bellesiles, Revolutionary Outlaws: Ethan Allen and the Struggle for Independence
on the Early American Frontier, (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1993), 158.	
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claimed it was their natural right to erect a state; this claim of natural right, and its
relationship to the concept of sovereignty in Vermont, is the crux of this study.
Bringing the Vermont experience into the larger discussion of the concept of
sovereignty is not only fruitful for Vermont scholarship, but the unique case study also
adds to the more general historiography of sovereignty in the eighteenth century. My
study looks to build on the understanding of sovereignty put forward by Edmund
Morgan’s Inventing the People: The Rise of Popular Sovereignty in England and
America.7 Morgan contends that sovereignty was a “myth” necessary to the functioning
of government in the British state during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. His
primary argument—that sovereignty was an abstract ideal, which citizens and
governments simultaneously, yet cautiously moved toward—was a significant break
from previous scholarship that analyzed the concept of sovereignty primarily from the
words of intellectuals. Morgan traced the relationship between the people and
government via a thorough analysis of both rhetorical and systematic alterations that
influenced ideas of sovereignty in the British empire, ultimately concluding with the
creation of the American people in 1776. Morgan’s juxtaposition of rhetoric and events
is a model for this project.
To perform this juxtaposition, I will examine how the people of Vermont
interacted with the myth of sovereignty. Such an analysis would not be possible without
Christian Fritz’s American Sovereigns: The People and America’s Constitutional

7

Edmund Morgan, Inventing the People: The Rise of Popular Sovereignty in England and
America, (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1988).
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Tradition Before the Civil War.8 Fritz examines different Euro-American communities
to see how “the people” expressed their role as sovereign through interposition, public
disorder, and polemics. One community in particular that receives Fritz’s attention is
Vermont. His analysis of Vermonters during the period of state formation is based
heavily on natural law philosophy, which he asserts thrived in the region during the time
of the Revolution. Vermonters’ belief in the “right, if not the duty, to resist tyranny and
oppression” was rooted in the long tradition of English constitutionalism; a tradition that
was replicated in America. Although American constitutionalism “contained within
itself” a potential for instability, it was the sovereign people that formed the “foundation
for all of America’s new governments.” This change over time from the sovereignty of
the state to the sovereignty of the people is by far the most important theme of this work.
This thesis is divided into three chapters. The first chapter will examine the
concept of sovereignty as it evolved both theoretically and systematically in English
society. I begin by examining the philosophy of René Descartes (1596-1650). Descartes’s
thesis in Meditations on First Philosophy (1641)— that Man9 was a creature with the
divine gift of free will, and that with careful study, humans could use their free will to

8

Christian Fritz, American Sovereigns: The People and America’s Constitutional Tradition
Before the Civil War, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008). Another analytical study
with a nuanced approach to sovereignty is Mark Schmeller, Invisible Sovereign: Imagining
Public Opinion from the Revolution to Reconstruction, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 2016), which, although only recently published, has already provided much for the
historical analysis of sovereignty in early America.
9
	
  While I acknowledge the scholarship pertaining to all three philosophers’ use of the word
“Man,” I was unable to include a discussion of this topic within this thesis. Eighteenth-century
notions of masculinity certainly played a significant role in Vermont, but gender relations were
beyond the scope of this project.	
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discover truth without direct assistance from God—was fundamental to his influence on
the political philosophy of both Hobbes and Locke.10 These two political philosophers
went a great deal further to understand government as a natural process solely initiated
by, and for the benefit of, Man. Both philosophers determined that the state of nature,
where they believed Man had no restriction on his will, was undesirable. Thus
government, as it was understood by Hobbes and Locke, was a necessary aspect of
human society. Both philosophers saw consent and trust as vital to a successful
government. Following Morgan’s work, throughout this chapter I point out monumental
alterations in the functionality of English government during the seventeenth century.
That the state placed the people before all, including God, became an integral part of how
British subjects defined a legitimate government. By 1777, however, colonists across
America deemed the British state inefficient and unjust, and made the collective decision
to systematically replace it. Simply put, their justification was that if government was
established for the people, then the people reserved a natural right to abolish the
governmental system. This chapter concludes with an analysis of Thomas Jefferson’s
notion of the “Vermont doctrine.” His comments, written in 1783, represent a
culmination of over a century of philosophers conceptualizing the relationship between
sovereignty and the state of nature. It does appear, however, that he did not precisely
understand how that notion applied to the Vermont experience.

10

Although there exists an argument that Hobbes did not believe humans had the ability to
uncover truth, I do not believe a distinction is necessary in this project between ultimate truth
and something very close to it. See James Martel, Subverting the Leviathan: Reading Thomas
Hobbes as a Radical Democrat, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 81-2.
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Building on my short treatment of Vermont’s “state of nature” in the conclusion
of the previous chapter, the second chapter leaves behind the more theoretical perspective
and focuses specifically on Vermont’s socio-political environment prior to the American
Revolution. The Hampshire Grants, as the territory was initially known, was formally
acquired by Great Britain following the French and Indian War. Prior to the siege of
Montreal in 1760, the Green Mountains were a rather uninviting location for English
colonists: the land was frequented by Native and French scouts and seasonal hunters of
Algonquin dialect. To make matters worse, seldom did reports from the scattered British
frontier posts provide welcoming news. That all began to change in 1759 as the British
military began its push towards Montreal. Located on the western frontier of New
Hampshire, the northeastern frontier of New York, and the northern frontier of
Massachusetts, Grants inhabitants struggled to develop a society their contemporaries
would have considered “civil.” After the crown determined the territory belonged to New
York in 1764, inhabitants expected the government to provide the necessary aspects of
civil society—a functioning judicial system, the protection of property, and the security
of their livelihoods. For some, these expectations were not met, and thus they viewed it
as their right to refute and replace the inefficient system. While the majority of
inhabitants stood with New York authority, by the early 1770s they could not ignore the
growing opposition as it transformed into the Green Mountain Boys: an aggressive,
consolidated, and powerful movement, produced by the inefficiency of the New York
colony.

9

And finally, the third chapter discusses the period of the independent Vermont
state and its transition out of a perceived state of nature. Shortly after the Revolution
began, those who opposed New York’s authority drafted the Vermont constitution in
1777; and by 1778, Vermont participated in the American Revolution as an independent
state. The system of government established by the constitution gave a massive amount
of power to the freemen of Vermont, with the intention of establishing “the people” as
ultimate authority. Determined in their cause, Vermonters worked to remain independent
and defended the state’s autonomy against both internal and external threats to their claim
of legitimacy. Both grudging Yorkers residing within their claimed territory and
commentators from neighboring states referred to Vermont as a “pretended” state for the
first few years of independence. By 1785, however, all this had changed, and all who
lived within the former Hampshire Grants considered themselves Vermonters. For the
first time since the state’s inception in 1777, Vermont possessed the support of all its
inhabitants. This domestic transition, one that moved towards the establishment of civil
society, enabled Vermont to approach the Constitutional Convention as a sovereign
entity.

10

CHAPTER 1: A PLEA TO THE NATURAL WORLD
Since Aristotle, political theorists have examined the metaphor of the “state of
nature” in search of a true and legitimate form of government. Prior to René Descartes
(1596-1650), however, this mode of inquiry searched for truth in the nature of a being-i.e. God or an ideal form of Man—that was not universally applicable to all humans. In
Meditations on the First Philosophy (1641), Descartes argued that he, as a human, had
uncovered philosophically and scientifically grounded objective truth about the true
nature of all Man, an ability previously thought to be reserved for God(s) only.11
Descartes’s innovative perspective of Man revolutionized the way political theorists
understood human society and government.
With this approach, I am following James V. Schall’s claim that “any theoretical
explanation of politics depends on attitudes and positions which stem from metaphysics,
theology, ethics, or science”—all of which Descartes was well versed in.12 Descartes’s

11

In 1627 or 1628, after attending a meeting of contemporary skeptics looking to undermine the
Scholastic school’s hold on academics, Descartes refused to accept the lecturer’s findings, stating
that they still settled for “mere probability.” See Steven Nadler, The Philosopher, the Priest, and
The Painter: A Portrait of Descartes, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013), 92. For
Descartes’s opposition to Galileo’s understanding of nature as “an unintegrated condition and
lacking in philosophical foundations,” see James Collins, “Descartes’s Philosophy of Nature” in
American Philosophical Quarterly Monograph Series no. 5, ed. Nicholas Rescher, (Pittsburgh:
Basil Blackwell with the cooperation of the University of Pittsburgh, 1971), 40-41. Peter A.
Schouls, The Imposition of Method: A Study of Descartes and Locke (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1980), 6. Schouls states that Man’s ability to be “rational” was defined more broadly by Descartes
than had been done previously. For more on Descartes and the scholastics, see Stephen
Gaukroger, Descartes’s System of Natural Philosophy, (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2002), 35-48.
12
James Schall, “Cartesianism and Political Theory,” in The Review of Politics, Vol. 24, No. 2
(April, 1962), pp. 260-282; 260. Collins, Philosophy of Nature, 43: “The function of metaphysics
is not to render this distinct analysis superfluous or to supplant it with other meanings. Instead,
metaphysics broadens the entire context of the inquiry into nature, so as to face the existential

11

depiction of nature was abstract and deeply spiritual in its essence, but on the surface he
used rationalistic rhetoric. The fundamental component of his metaphysics was his
depiction of Man as a creature who made both rational and irrational decisions based on
the memory of material experience (even if it was to doubt them). At the same time,
Descartes acknowledged that Man was hampered by a material body which naturally
desired material things. This materialistic metaphysics provided a detailed blueprint for
the wave of empirically-minded political thinkers in the late seventeenth and early
eighteenth centuries. The acknowledgement of two distinct worlds, one physical and the
other mental, ultimately led Descartes to determine that there existed a mind and body.
He believed this dualism to be an irrefutable aspect of reality. Descartes set out in
Meditations to philosophically justify a secularization of studies pertaining to the natural
world.13 Hobbes and Locke, and then the American states, appropriated Descartes’s
metaphysics for their political ideas.
Cartesian Nature
There is a good reason René Descartes is seldom brought up in the discussion of
seventeenth-century political philosophers. A recluse by nature, he tried to distance
himself from cities, company, and most intellectuals. He was also hesitant to speak

question and relate the complex significance of nature to the other reflective interpretants of
human experience.” Also, Timothy Reiss considers the possibility that Descartes’s metaphysics
had lasting effects on other areas of study, including politics. His example is when Jean Le Rond
d’Alembert in the eighteenth century considered Descartes a plausible “leader of conspirators
who, before anyone else, had the courage to rise against a despotic and arbitrary power.”
“Descartes, the Palatine, and the Thirty Years War: Political Theory and Political Practice” in
Yale French Studies, no. 80, (1991), pp. 108-145; 124.
13
Descartes’s System of Natural Philosophy, 77.
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openly about government and high politics, and only did so with gentlemanly restraint.
In correspondence with Elizabeth of the Palatinate, when Elizabeth requested that they
both study Machiavelli’s Prince, Descartes respectfully replied, “I deserve to be mocked
if I think I might be able to teach something to your Highness in this matter.”14 His
awkwardness stemmed from his belief that he did not think of himself as a “Prince.” He
stated that a Prince is ordained by God to lead, much like a scientist is ordained by God
to do science. Princes and sovereigns have different rules than he: “For justice between
Sovereigns has other limits than between individuals, and it seems that in these
encounters God gives the right to those to whom he gives the power.”15
Descartes’s self- proclaimed distance from the realm of politics paved the way
for a deferential relationship between the people and state in the Cartesian concept of
sovereignty. For Descartes, a government’s sole purpose was to maintain order: “political
disorder can interfere with man’s life of thought, even though thought is not essentially
subject to material conditions. Therefore, the task of politics [and government] is to
guarantee by force a calm and peaceful social and political order.”16 As long as
individuals possessed their freedom of inquiry, Descartes believed the sovereign was
legitimate.17 To pay attention to Descartes in a discussion of political history may at first

14

Andrea Nye, Princess and the Philosopher: Letters of Elisabeth of the Palatine to René
Descartes, (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1991), 103.
15
Nye, 103 and 123.
16
Reiss, “Descartes, the Palatine, and the Thirty Years War,” 264.
17
Descartes embodied his political theory in real life as he moved almost freely throughout the
European countryside searching for a location in which he saw fit to settle. He first lived in
France, then the Netherlands, and ultimately in Sweden, where he died in February, 1650.

13

seem peculiar, but his philosophy was a foundational element of eighteenth-century
political philosophy.
Descartes’s fundamental contribution to political philosophy was his theory of
Man. First and most important was Man’s free will. While more politically oriented
contemporaries defined “property” or “security” as the most sacred possession of
humans, Descartes believed Man’s most prized possession was a God-like free will:
“Free will is in itself the noblest thing we have, since it makes us in a way equal to
God.”18 This position, according to Timothy Reiss, was “wholly different from what
could have been thought before.”19 Descartes’s free will theory, and perhaps his entire
metaphysics, was completely reliant on his dualism.20 There was the physical world—
full of material objects and occurrences that one could use the senses to detect—and the
world of one’s mind and soul—the mental process of understanding the physical. In order
to make free will truly free, Descartes determined that the motion of one’s will must be
unhindered. As for the physical world, or “body,” it was a necessary aspect of reality
because it was Descartes’s belief, as Steven Nadler states, that “there is and can be no
truly empty space; matter—extension—is everywhere and the universe is a plenum.”21

18

Quoted from a letter to Queen Christina in November, 1647. Noa Naaman-Zauderer,
Descartes’s Deontological Turn: Reason, Will and Virtue in the Later Writings, (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2010), 131.
19
Reiss, “Descartes, the Palatine, and the Thirty Years War,” 127. Reiss defends this compelling
statement by arguing that the concept is not found in Montaigne, and that prior to Descartes,
human free will was always considered subordinate to God’s, thus never relatable.
20
For a discussion of Descartes’s notion of free will as it relates to metaphysics, see Nye, Princess
and the Philosopher, 74.
21
The Philosopher, The Priest, 113-116.
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Within this world, Man experienced only “physical things and minds or souls capable of
knowing those things.”22
A deeper understanding of the mind and body’s ability in Man is necessary in
order to locate the influence of Descartes in the political philosophy of Locke and
Hobbes. On the ability of the mind, one must look to the human relationship between
God, Man, and truth, which Descartes explored in his first three Meditations. He began
by doubting the existence of “all things, and especially of material objects” in his First
Meditation.23 Using a “skeptically driven epistemology to systematically strip down the
world,” Descartes reduced his thought to a state where no previously held notion
existed—his nature.24 By searching for an ounce of reality in his Second Meditation,
Descartes concluded that beyond reasonable doubt, he himself did, in truth, exist.25 From
this first principle (that he existed) he was then able to confront the existence of God, the
“sovereign being,” in his third Meditation.
Descartes had to first argue against the skeptic’s argument that human
subjectivity created God, and that God did not pre-exist. He did this by arguing that
because the reality of truth is undeniable, a realm of perfection must infinitely exist (“Yet,
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on looking more closely into the matter, I discover that this cannot be…although there
were potentially in my nature much that was not as yet actually in it, still all these
excellences make not the slightest approach to the idea I have of the Deity, in whom there
is no perfection merely potentially [but all actually] existent.”26) God dwells in this realm
of perfection.27 Descartes supported the existence of God with the following statement:
“I could not possibly be of such a nature as I am, and yet have in my mind the idea of a
God, if God did not in reality exist.”28 The “slight conception” of God and his existence,
“though incomparably less perfect,” was based on Man’s ability to discover truth. For
Descartes, God was but an entity composed of unlimited truth.
Descartes’s belief in the potential of Man to uncover truth was a large break from
contemporary philosophy.29 Within European intellectual thought, the Protestant
Reformation, which promoted the idea that individuals ought to have an active personal
relationship with God, had only occurred in the previous century; the idea that everyone
possessed an aspect of God’s power was radical. If Man possessed a God-like free will
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along with the ability to discover truth, how could Man not be God? God, according to
Descartes, did not have a dualistic nature, he was one with the world. Man, on the other
hand, is only connected to the physical world by the mind experiencing it. The natural
reality of the human condition, something philosophers had confronted for ages, was not
seen as a disadvantage by Descartes; it was simply an aspect of reality.
Though the infinite possibility of truth is within Man, there existed the potential
that one could “lose the rights it gives us through timidity.”30 “Timidity” was the
influence on Man of any forces (including passion) that opposed reason during the
thinking process.31 Rather than denounce the tendency, Descartes suggested that some
may simply not “know how to use that good sense [reason] properly.”32 With his
philosophy, Descartes believed himself to have found truth that did not depend on
support from “elements furnished by faith.” Truths of the physical world would become
self-evident, he argued, once one adopted his Method—the precursor of theoretical
sciences.33
Descartes’s separation of mind and body ushered in a nuanced approach to
political society. If Man’s mind had divine attributes, according to Descartes, then the
human understanding of the world must possess at least some knowledge of the general
direction of truth. Government, as it was understood by both Hobbes and Locke, is an
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aspect of the physical world so fundamentally necessary to human society that only an
occurrence of divine rationality could have produced it. Thus, to best understand
government, these philosophers examined the existence of Man during the state of nature
to search for “efficient causation” of government.34 In other words, these philosophers
did not look to the state of nature as a source for practical governance, rather, they looked
to the state of nature to find the rationalistic essence of government.

International and domestic warfare persisted throughout seventeenth-century Europe as
armies defended individual monarchs’ divine right to rule. But in England, “duty toward
God gave way to the rights of men,” and thus “a new ideology, a new rationale, a new
set of fictions was necessary to justify a government in which the authority of kings stood
below that of the people or their representatives.”35 Individuals saw that the king was not
“absolute in fact as in theory.”36 It became accepted as a British truism that the practical
authority of the king, sanctioned by God Himself, was now below the authority of the
people. The English Revolution (1642-1649), which occurred almost exactly between
the publication of Descartes’s Meditations and that of Hobbes’s Leviathan, left political
rhetoric in turmoil as divine right was challenged not by others who claimed the position,
but by an increasing number of people who doubted the reality of the divine right of
monarchs. The king’s divine right had been challenged by the Parliamentarians, and now,
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as Edmund Morgan has argued, there existed a void to be filled. Who fulfilled the divine
purpose of government if not the monarch? Could the people, mere peasants even,
technically have more “divine right” than the king? The concept of popular sovereignty
in western governance was born: “the people are the governed; they are also, at least
fictionally, the governors, at once subjects and rulers.”37
Thomas Hobbes: The Sovereign and State
As Hobbes stated in Leviathan, “the skill of making, and maintaining
commonwealths, consisteth in certain rules, as doth arithmetic and geometry; not (as
tennis-play) in practice only: which rules, neither poor men have the leisure, nor men that
have had the leisure, have hitherto had the curiosity, or the method [sic] to find out.”38
Hobbes, like Descartes, set out to perfect what he considered the shortcomings of
previous political philosophers.39 Descartes created the first rational and, for all intents
and purposes, relatively clear description of Man “in nature”; Hobbes was simply among
the first philosophers to find out what this new depiction of Man meant for political
inquiry.40
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Hobbes looked to the natural human world for truth without simultaneously
denying the existence God, similar to Descartes.41 Timothy Reiss, in his semiphilosophical article on history and Descartes, stated that after Descartes’s work was
published in the 1640s, Hobbes stated
like the spirit of God moving over the deep in the second verse of Genesis, the
true philosopher must let his ‘reason move upon the deep of his [own] cogitations
and experience…’ It was almost as if the very processes of reason had been
hypostatized into their object of study: here the object was the state and civil
society.42
This was merely the metaphysics behind Hobbes’s political treatise, however—his
starting point. Descartes directly influenced the history of ontological and metaphysical
philosophy, but his work seldom went beyond the self. Hobbes’s Leviathan picked up
where Meditations left off by considering the natural state of human interaction.
Following Descartes, Hobbes saw little difference in the nature of individual
humans: “the difference between Man, and Man, is not so considerable, as that one Man
can thereupon claim to himself any benefit, to which another may not pretend, as well as
he.”43 The free will that humans naturally possessed, according Hobbes, must originally
have produced a perpetual violent war “of all men, against all men.” The equality of free
will in nature allowed Man to do whatever he felt was necessary, and thus no one could
be safe when “the way of one competitor, to the attaining of his desire, is to kill, subdue,
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supplant, or repel the other.”44 For Hobbes, it was specifically for the purpose of security
that political communities were created. Determining that this original life was
unacceptable for the human’s mind and body, Hobbes argued that a transition must have
occurred in society when individuals began to cooperate. Both the natural reason and
passion of Man played a pivotal role in bringing these original communities out of that
natural state: human passion left one searching for peace, and human reason then guided
individuals to agreements establishing the peace.45 Cooperation, however, was only the
first step to creating civil society, the end goal of all government to Hobbes.
Hobbes’s definition of civil society is perhaps the most abstract aspect of
Leviathan, but it did rest on his clear and concise description of the laws of nature.
Hobbes believed natural laws were “properly called laws” because they were “delivered
in the word of God, that by right commandeth all things.” 46 As well, natural law differed
from natural right: “right” was Man’s ability to do “any thing, which in his own
judgment, and reason, he shall conceive to be the aptest means” of surviving. A law of
nature, in contrast, was a “precept, or general rule, found out by reason” that was opposed
to Man’s natural right.47 In other words, in the state of nature, natural right was simply
the god-like free will all humans possess—to act as they see fit; the laws of nature,
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however, were innate to the human condition, similar to passion, but uniform and
objective throughout humanity.48
To Hobbes, the fundamental law of nature was that man “ought to endeavor
peace.”49 In nature, humans hesitate to work with one another due to the fear that one
may be deceived because of another’s natural right to do as they pleased: where
“everyman has a Right to everything,” and thus everyone lived in a state of perpetual
war, it would be a “general rule of Reason…to seek Peace, and follow it.” But for
Hobbes, natural laws were “but conclusions, or theorems concerning what conduceth to
the conservation and defense of [Man]”; there was nothing aside from Man’s desire for
peace and to preserve his own life that caused the use of natural law. Thus the second
Law— “That a man be willing, when others are so too, as farre-forth, as for Peace, and
defence of himselfe he shall think it necessary, to lay down this right to [Freedom]; and
be contended with so much liberty against other men, as he would allow other men
against himselfe”—resolved the problem of how to seek peace in nature. It was derived
from Hobbes’s belief that only by individuals working together could a society be taken
out of nature. Similar to the Golden Rule, in Hobbes’s description of civil society,
individuals actually ‘do to others as they wish done to them.’50 But in order for this to
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occur, and for natural laws to transform into civil laws, Hobbes suggested that there must
exist “trust.”
“Trust” was crucial to the process by which a society rose out of nature. He did
not use the word “trust” differently from the twenty-first century definition: Webster’s
Dictionary defines trust as “firm belief in the honesty, reliability, etc. of another; faith.”51
Hobbes simply extended the definition to include human interaction in nature: “In the
condition of meer nature…upon any reasonable suspition, [trust] is Voyd.”52 Without
trust, no social circumstance “where there is [no] feare of not performance on either part”
could theoretically exist.53 “In a civil estate,” however, “where there is a Power set to
constrain those that would otherwise violate their faith, that feare is no more
reasonable.”54 In following the logic of Hobbes’s concept of trust, no legitimate civil
society could occur without it. While humans may trust their own subjective relationship
to the laws of nature, they cannot trust that of others. Therefore, in order to initiate some
form of civility, a situation must have occurred in which “a multitude of Men, are made
one person, when they are by one Man, or one person, represented.”55 Behold Hobbes’s
vision of how a commonwealth comes to be. That it was deemed necessary by Hobbes
to mention the moment when a plurality of voices were reduced “unto one will: which is
as much as to say, to appoint one man, or assembly of men, to bear their person,”

51

Webster’s New World Dictionary and Thesaurus Second Edition, (New York, Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2013), 676.
52
Leviathan, 91.
53
Ibid., 95.
54
Ibid., 91.
55
Ibid., 109.

23

demonstrated a new phase of confidence in the universality of political discourse.57Once
all voices are combined into a single will, the singular voice of a people is possible. The
society Hobbes imagines is ideal, to him, because it removes “the feare of not
performance.” But it could only appear once “there is a Power” to restrain Man’s
unlimited free will.
The entity that possessed the “Power set to constrain” was Hobbes’ sovereign.
Man could not have a peaceful coexistence if everyone possessed unlimited right: How
could humans expect to work reasonably with one another if trust did not bind their
obligations? Hobbes’s sovereign possessed the necessary power to perform the task of
ensuring peace. The sovereign, as “either one, or more, or all,” of course, did not
naturally have this amount of power, however.58 The creation of sovereignty required a
voluntary sacrifice of Man’s free will. Only after humans “confer all their power and
strength upon one man,” could sovereignty emerge. The relationship between the
sovereign and people is clear: “he that carrieth this [Power], is called Sovereign…and
everyone besides, his Subject.”59 In the final section of Chapter XVIII, Hobbes confronts
those who may object to his philosophy and argue “that the condition of subjects is very
miserable.”60 He replies that the power of sovereigns is similar in all kinds of
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governmental systems, not just monarchy: “if they be perfect enough to protect [their
constituents], [power] is the same.” The system must receive the faith and free will of
each individual it presides over to provide this perfect protection.
Does Hobbes then assert that the role of Man was that of blind submission to
authority? Not quite. The subject of Hobbes’s commonwealth is “free,” by which he
meant free of opposition from “external impediments of motion.”61 The only thing that
prevented subjects from freely moving throughout the world was confrontation with
“some external body,” that is another commonwealth. Within the dominion of their own
commonwealth, they were free to move and live life freely according to the “artificial
chains, called civil laws.”62 When discussing the power balance of subjects and these
artificial chains, Hobbes argued that there exists something called the “true liberty of a
subject.” These “true liberties” are similar to the claim in the American Declaration of
Independence that all Men have the right to “life” and “liberty.” A Man may justly oppose
a sovereign who asks an individual to “kill, wound, or maim himself”; nor can the
sovereign expect one to confess to a crime one has committed, and thus willingly dispose
of his “liberty.”63 “The obligation of subject to the sovereign, is understood to last as
long, and no longer” than the sovereign protects the lives of subjects. These events only
concerned specific occasions, however, and would not dissolve the entire sovereign
entity.
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Hobbes understood government as an organic event: “For by [Nature] is created
that great Leviathan called a Commonwealth, or a State, which is but an Artificiall Man
[sic]” with many parts: “Sovereignty…an artificial soul,” officials are “artificial joints,”
“reward

and

punishment….the

nerves,”

“wealth

and

riches….strength,”

“counsellors…the memory,” “equity and laws…artificial reason and will,” and finally,
“the pacts and covenants…first made, set together, and united, resemble [God’s creation
of Man].”64 Sovereignty, the “soul,” was the most divine part of Hobbes’s state, but how
could one’s individual soul be accounted for in a system of governance?65 For Hobbes,
the monarchical system of government simplified this predicament: sovereignty resided
in the monarch’s soul, the divine appendage of his or her body.
A counter position emerged amongst Hobbes’ contemporaries, however, who
argued it was the people’s soul which is sovereign. The increasing faith in the reasoning
faculty of Man during the seventeenth century came to fruition in English governance
through the ascendancy of Parliament. The king was interpreted as the earthly
representation of God:
Like God he was omnipresent, for in himself he constituted the “body politic”
over which he ruled. But like the son whom God sent to redeem mankind, he was
man as well as God; he had a “body natural” as well as his body politic, and the
two were inseparable like the persons of the Trinity.66
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But just as God was slowly being replaced by Man’s insurgence as the only arbiter of
truth, monarchs began to lose their place as the ultimate source of state authority after
the English Civil War. By time of the Glorious Revolution in England later in the
seventeenth century, the throne’s authority became dependent on Parliament as James II
was replaced by William and Mary in 1689. Not only did Parliament’s symbolic power
increase—signified by their action of “hiring” the king—but their systematic power grew
as well, in that “the freedom of speech and debates of proceedings in Parliament ought
not to be impeached or questioned in any court or place out of Parliament.”67 Parliament
had become unquestionable as the governmental embodiment of the people. And thus by
the late seventeenth century, “the legislature” became “the fundamental power in
society…the supreme power of the commonwealth.”68 That the people developed into a
legitimate source of political authority by the eighteenth century is a certainty, but
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defining exactly who the people were or how they expressed their power was
problematic, even for John Locke.69
John Locke: The People and State
Hobbes envisioned a rationalistic scenario in which humans created the
sovereign; John Locke’s theory of government used an empirical approach to attempt to
ensure that the trust between Man and sovereign was sustained. Locke, like Descartes,
was a successful epistemological philosopher.70 Descartes’s “unlimited trust in natural
reason” had a great influence on Locke’s basic understanding of human intellect, which
stemmed from his faith in reason as the umpire of truth.71 Locke “repeatedly taunt[ed]
the upholders of orthodoxy for their lack of confidence in the truth of their doctrines,
challenging them to put their doctrines to the test of reason.”72 For Locke, reason is God’s
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most sacred gift to mankind; reason is “itself a moral obligation and only by employing
[it] can we reach a proper understanding of both duty and faith.”73 Although
commonalities in the essential function of reason are found in all three philosophers,
Locke’s faith in the universality of reason had a more extreme influence on his theory of
government. His depiction of the state of nature ultimately produced a political
philosophy that favored an individual-oriented concept of sovereignty, rather than the
state-oriented version conceived by Hobbes.
On the actual concept of “sovereignty,” Locke was relatively quiet. Peter Meyers
asserts that Locke’s hesitancy to discuss the topic of sovereignty was a result of the
philosopher’s rational understanding of Man. Meyers notes: “the principle of pure human
sovereignty requires that we refuse to submit to any rule not of our own making[.]” A
government that does not provide a systematic role for the people “delegitimates the
governance of reason itself, which aims at discovering, not making, the rules to which
we are properly subject.”74 Building on Meyers’ point, since Locke considered a
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government to be legitimate only if it gained the consent of the people, the essence of
Locke’s political theory is to define a systematic role for the people:
people…have a right to reinstate their legislative in the exercise of their
power…they should exercise the power of making laws, either at certain set times,
or when there is need of it, when they are hindered by any force from what is so
necessary to the society, and wherein the safety and preservation of the people
consists, the people have a right to remove it by force.75
“Revolutionary logic”—that legitimate states could be established, and dissolved, only
by the people themselves—is the creation of Locke.
Locke’s initial description of the state of nature was quite similar to Hobbes’s;
unlimited free will was a fundamental truth of the human condition, according to both
philosophers. Locke introduced nature in Two Treatises as “what state all men are
naturally in, and that is, a state of perfect freedom to order their actions, and dispose of
their possessions and persons, as they think fit.”76 Similar to Hobbes, Locke argued that
the “only way whereby any one divests himself of his natural liberty, and puts on the
bonds of civil society, is by agreeing with other men to join [together]…for their
comfortable, safe and peaceable living amongst another.”77 Locke went a step further
than Hobbes, however, in replacing the former’s focus on the preservation of life with a
new emphasis on property, and the preservation thereof, as the “chief end” of civil
society.78 Once this community was formed, “every man, by consenting with
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others…puts himself under an obligation to every one of that society, to submit to the
determination of the majority.” Whereas Hobbes looked to an individual (the sovereign)
to embody the will of the whole, Locke argued that Man ought to only submit his
unlimited free will to the will of the majority.
Locke was rather critical of a pure monarchical system—one in which individuals
sacrificed their own will to that of a single Man. Monarchy, Locke considered, was the
“most obvious and simple” of the ways government could be formed.79 In earlier periods
of the state of nature, there had not yet been much complexity to life—it was one
individual’s will versus another’s. In such small communities,
The equality of a simple poor way of living, confining their desires within the
narrow bounds of each man’s small property, made few controversies, and so no
need of many laws to decide them, or variety of officers to superintend the
process, or look after the execution of justice, where there were but few
trespasses, and few offenders.80
Locke suggested that if it had not been for this first simple monarchical political
organization, “young societies could not have subsisted.”81 Without such leaders to
conduct these infant commonwealths, and “without such nursing fathers tender and
careful of the public weal [well-being], all governments would have sunk under the
weakness of infirmities of their infancy.” But that was a different age from today, said
Locke; once princes learned “to have distinct and separate interests from their people,”
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it became necessary to formulate a new government and evolve the system—an evolution
Hobbes had not considered
In chapter XI, “Of the Extent of the Legislative Power,” Locke exposed the true
colors of his philosophy. It is here, in the first chapter after Locke established the “Forms
of a Commonwealth,” that he explained his concept of “supreme authority.” Chapter XI
begins with Locke stating that (as described in his previous chapter) the “first and
fundamental positive law of all commonwealths is the establishing of the legislative
power.”82 The legislature’s purpose was none other than the “preservation of the society,”
and it acted as the land’s “supreme power.” Locke defined supreme power as the ultimate
creator of “law” within a given community, an ability no entity could have without
consent from the society. It was “ridiculous” to Locke for a state to create laws without
that consent.83 Chapter XI thus set out to explain how a legislature is to act as the agent
of the consenting society.
Locke made a significant leap from his contemporaries in this chapter by
equating supreme state authority with the people. But he admitted that this system was
paradoxical in its essence: “though it be the supreme power in every commonwealth,”
the legislative is not “absolutely arbitrary over the lives and fortunes of the people.”84
The government was supreme until it threatened the “lives and fortunes of the people.”
Locke then spent the most time in this chapter defining what he meant by “fortunes.” He
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stated that no legislative power could take the property of its subjects without their
consent: “And to let us see, that even absolute power, where it is necessary, is not
arbitrary by being absolute.”85 The state’s ultimate power, the legislative, ought to be
absolute, but not arbitrary—which he equated with “despotic power.”86
A despot is one who holds absolute power, but according to Locke, despotism
could exist only in two cases. The more obvious case that Locke spent little time
discussing was the master and slave relationship: a slave from a “just war” was a slave
until “he be once allowed to be master of his own life,” at which time “the despotical,
arbitrary power of his master ceases.” The other case concerned subjects within a
political society who allowed a despotic government to establish itself: “it is the effect
only of forfeiture…for [only by] having quitted reason, which God hath given to be the
rule betwixt man and man…and having renounced the way of peace” could mankind
allow such a government to exist. As Locke concluded Chapter XI, he stated four simple
rules that a state’s supreme authority ought to follow: it should govern by laws that are
established without the interest of particular subjects; the laws established should be
designed “for no other end ultimately, but the good of the people”; it should only raise
taxes (take property) through consent; and it cannot relieve itself of its duties and place
its power anywhere “but where the people have” already placed it.87
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In conclusion, for Locke, the prerogative of the government should be one with
the prerogative of its subjects; and if this is not so, “the people under [t]his government
are not a society of rational creatures, entered into a community for their mutual
good.”88Although Locke’s work has since been praised for his general inclusion of
property, it became increasingly unclear in the century that followed Two Treatises’
publication precisely how the prerogative of “rational creatures” ought to be calculated
into governance.89
If the “state of nature” metaphor was to yield any practical lessons, political
theorists must first understand the Man who experienced it. Descartes was most
influential in developing the concept of Man as a thinking creature who had the ability
to attain perfect truth. Through an analysis of both the mind’s and the body’s experiences
in nature, both Locke and Hobbes logically concluded that the state of nature was
undesirable for Man. To protect individuals from an unending chaos, both philosophers
determined there must have been a natural and rational formation of a powerful entity
to bring mankind out of the undesirable natural state—and that entity was government.
For all three philosophers, government was a natural aspect of human society—part of
the physical world—and thus possessed truth for the human mind to observe.
But there was more to Leviathan and Two Treatises than these foundational
agreements, and the discrepancies found in their discourse went on to produce two ends
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of the conceptual spectrum of political sovereignty. The disagreement concerned who
the sovereign actually is. Hobbes was clear about this: Man created government, and that
government was the sovereign. Whether it be a legislature or a king, the government
created out of nature was the sovereign state. Writing from the Whig perspective during
the Glorious Revolution in England, Locke was more skeptical of tyrannical sovereigns.
Since it was Man that ultimately held the positions in government, an involved citizenry
assured that a state would not usurp its power and act in too disconnected of a manner
from the people. Locke’s desire to include the people shows two things: first, that Locke
ultimately did accept the government’s composite power as sovereign. And second, that
the theoretical power of the people had grown exponentially since Hobbes’ work.
Less than a century after Locke’s death, at the time of Vermont’s tumultuous
infancy, the discourse of a “sovereign people” emerged.
“Whether in the Wild Woods and Uncultivated Waste of America”
As with much of the writing that comes from the pens of intellectuals, there was
a slow percolation of these philosophical ideas into the common framework of thought
in the colonies. Political excerpts from the newspapers of New England, where many of
the future inhabitants of Vermont were born, provide an overview of the contemporary
popular concept of sovereignty.90 The abstract metaphor of the state of nature, used by
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Hobbes and Locke, played a crucial role in the discussion of sovereignty in eighteenthcentury British-American newspapers. Through a revived interest in original charters,
and a print community that disseminated political tracts of Lockean and Hobbesian
ideology, the state of nature settled into its place as a trope of British-American political
discourse. But the “state of nature” is only mentioned in this literature as a theoretical
state, not one that can be experienced in reality.
In the Boston Evening Post, for example, an anonymous writer identified as
“Your Lordship’s most obedient humble Servant” explained how charters were
fundamental to understanding ultimate political authority.91 According to “Servant,”
charters had been established in the Americas to lift the migrants out of the state of nature.
The charters—established by “those whose forefathers fled into the wilderness to avoid
the intolerable oppression and arbitrary power of the faithless Stuarts”—Servant
considered “sacred.” Once in the wilderness of America, there was “no civil government
but what they form’d themselves.” By selecting “agents” to represent them, Servant’s
forefathers became bound and protected by a greater power (Great Britain) under these
charters. By 1765, however, the state’s increase in taxation to replace costs from the
French and Indian War caused Servant to question the treatment of subjects on behalf of
the state. New England, Servant argued, had “during the course of the [French and Indian
War] furnish’d a reasonable quota both of men & money, [and] exerted themselves to
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the utmost.” Britain sending troops overseas and then expecting the colonies to pay for
it “violat[ed colonial] charters,” which guaranteed protection under the British sovereign
state. Not only was the government’s action unnecessary, Servant argued, but the
decision hindered colonial progress:
[sending troops] creat[ed] a large expence, to carry and support a useless, nay I
am sorry to say, a dissolute set of men, to live in idleness among them, and
deprave the manners of the people, which is of no small importance in infant
colonies, when the utmost industry is necessary to their own well-being, and their
utility to their mother country.
That the taxation was done without colonial consent was the final point made by Servant:
“If at any time there is a necessity of raising money from the colonies, let it be intimated
by the several Governors to their respective Assemblies.” While the author explained
that the systematic event of representation would prevent future controversy, Servant
concluded with an abstract gesture. The author requested the Ministry to act in “his
majesty’s interest, to rule in the hearts of a free people in America as well as in England.”
The Ministry was expected always to act in the interest of the king, which Servant now
argued was synonymous with the “hearts” of the people. The wills of the people and
sovereign state were expected to be one, according to Servant, although authority
remained strictly with the state.
As colonists paid close attention to the political crisis of the late 1760s and early
1770s, a sense of disconnection from government left the people wondering how to act.
To clarify the proper procedures in 1771, “Mutius Scaevola” followed the methodology
used by philosophers to imagine the circumstances that had required charters for his
37

ancestors in the first place.92 Scaevola argued in the Boston Gazette that charters had
been formed out of “necessity [by] the several legislative bodies of Great-Britain, Ireland
and the British Colonies.” All colonies were “perfectly distinct, and entirely independent
upon each other,” yet “connected only by their allegiance to their common sovereign,
whose common interest is their common prosperity, and whose supreme duty and
constant inclination is their common and indiscriminate protection.” This position, he
defended, “stands in fact & must stand firm, having the law of nature for its foundation.”
Drawing on both Hobbesian and Lockean theory, Scaevola argued that to bring people
out of nature was directly intertwined with their own consent: “there is an essential
difference between, requesting and demanding; the former is perfectly consistent with
liberty, the other, altogether destructive of it.” Any “alteration of the established
government…without the consent of the people…our gallant ancestors would have
waded thro’ seas of blood to combat.” Scaevola argued that once a government arbitrarily
alters the terms of governance, it “reduces the subject again to a state of nature, which
being a state of war.”
By 1774, it appeared increasingly evident throughout the British empire that the
thirteen American colonies would revolt. The outcry of the colonists during the previous
decade had fallen on deaf ears, and had now developed into a crisis of sovereignty. An
excerpt “offered to the Consideration of thinking Men” in the New-Hampshire Gazette
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noted just how powerful the authority of the people was.93 According to this author, the
public was in an uproar due to the British “Legislators [who] endeavor to take away and
destroy the property of the People, or to reduce them to Slavery under arbitrary Power.”
The power of the people in British thought was now so immense that if “ill treated, and
contrary to right, [they] will be ready on any Occasion to ease themselves of a Burden
that fit heavy upon them.” According to an increasing number of colonists, the
legislatures of the British system, whom Locke expected to be responsible for relieving
the disconnect between state and people, were in practice legitimated strictly by the title
of their office and not the merit of their actions. The author did not consider colonists the
rebels: “those, whoever they be, who by Force break through and by Force justify their
Violation…are truly and properly Rebels.” Once it was made clear to the colonists that
George III was but a man who “by Force justify their Violation,” his sovereign power
was dissolved.
The people individually could not govern the colonies, for that would be chaos;
and Great Britain could no longer rule, since that was now defined as political slavery.
Although the creation of a new sovereign state—the United States—had begun, it was
not completed until nearly fifteen years later. Between 1775 and 1783, British America
(and much of Europe for that matter) was in a state of war; the question of sovereignty
was in suspense as individuals grasped whatever authority they felt best secured their
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lives. There was, however, a new truth of governance that was found in nearly every state
constitution: “the people have a right, by common consent, to change [government], and
take such measures as to them may appear necessary to promote their safety and
happiness.”94
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CHAPTER 2: THE STATE OF NATURE IN THE HAMPSHIRE GRANTS

As demonstrated in the previous chapter, the “state of nature” became a common
trope well before the revolutionary-era discussion of sovereignty in British America. The
physical surroundings of authors who wrote about the relationship between nature and
sovereignty, however, seldom resembled a truly natural environment. Instead, authors
and philosophers were forced to envision an ideal natural state.

Some, like the

pseudonymous author “Servant,” recalled their “forefathers [who] fled into the
wilderness;” others, such as the commentator “Mutius Scaevola,” grounded their
arguments in “the law of nature.”
As the relationship between Britain and the colonies deteriorated, colonists felt
that the empire was literally casting them back into a state of nature. Yet, there still
existed a “Civill Power erected over the [people],” as Hobbes defined it, throughout
major cities where newspapers and common knowledge flourished.95 Benjamin Franklin
noted a differentiation between American civil order and Native American society,
which, as he believed, contained “no force…no prisons…no officers to compel
obedience, or inflict punishment.”96 His comments express the current understanding of
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civil society: it was only possible through a present and consistent relationship between
the people and authority. According to this definition, Jefferson asserted that a civil
power still existed in American cities, even without British control. Residents of frontier
communities, however, both because of their physical surroundings in “nature” and
because of their distance from civil authority, viewed themselves as actually living in a
real “state of nature.”97 Residents in the Green Mountains offer an excellent case study
of a settlement zone that operated quite close to the state of nature theorists envisioned.
After the French and Indian War, the future Vermont territory was
commandeered by Britain and annexed to the province of New York. Governor Benning
Wentworth of New Hampshire saw the possibility of the annexation working in his favor,
however, and began granting acres of land by the thousands.98 Migrants—predominantly
from New England colonies—flooded the region. The population grew at a faster rate
than any courts, churches, or practical civil authority could be established. Migrants
quickly became aware the land was full of promise only if there were a power to protect
it from the remaining native population, thieves, and individuals who looked to take
advantage of the lack of state authority. Establishing a single entity as sovereign in this
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region from 1763 to the eve of the American Revolution was complex because, legally
speaking, all colonial governments and subjects existed under the sovereign authority of
King George III. Colonists moved with this in mind, expecting the king and his provincial
governments to provide the necessary characteristics of British civil society to ensure a
stable community. As the population grew during the 1760s, the inability of the British
state to erect a commanding presence in the region left residents to fend for themselves
at every turn. The consequence of this event led inhabitants to ponder who truly
possessed ultimate authority in the region: was it the state, or the people?
The Creation of a “State of Nature”
As early as June 6, 1750, Governor George Clinton of New York wrote to
Governor Wentworth that he expected him to retract the grants he had conferred in this
territory in 1749, unless Wentworth desired Clinton “to Send a Representation of the
Matter…before his Majesty.”99 It has been argued that Wentworth’s actual legal claim-that New Hampshire’s boundary extended as far West as Massachusetts Bay’s and
Connecticut’s--was secondary to his more practical judgment that if he were able to
provide the region with actual settlers, the Board of Trade would conclude the matter in
his favor.100 But his original motivation mattered little since colonists were mostly
uninterested in a region with such a negative reputation.
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Fig. 1 From “Map of Canada and Louisiana which form New France and English colonies or are
represent the countries contend…” published by Chez Daumont, 1756, Library of Congress,
Maps Division, https://www.loc.gov/resource

A contemporary map clearly labels the land directly east and west of Lake
Champlain and Lac du Saint-Sacrement (Lake George) as an area contested by French
and Natives. Although this particular map does not label Abenaki territory, the Green
Mountains were occupied primarily by that group. The Abenakis, a branch of the
44

Algonquin people, were organized as a rather dispersed republic composed of scattered
kin and hunting groups throughout the Champlain and Connecticut River Valleys. They
solidified their stronghold on the region due to their knowledge of the land and a
persistent presence that no European had yet matched. Colin Callaway has determined
that the village at Missisquoi (present day northwestern Vermont) was “the best-known
and most enduring settlement.”101 A European visitor would be quickly reminded of the
native presence, which could be seen “passing and repassing [the] frontiers into heart of
country.”102 Before the French and Indian War, English settlers viewed the Green
Mountains as “both a forbidding wilderness and an Indian stronghold.”103 To those
residing in the more densely populated communities of British America, the region
symbolized a purgatory between British civilization and the French enemy in Montreal,
populated by “hostile” Natives.
Although the French were a greater threat to the British empire as a whole, the
native presence was perhaps the feature of the conflict that potential settlers feared most.
Like most native communities of eastern America, the Abenakis were forced to adapt to
fluctuating numbers caused by the northward migration of southern tribes, disease, and
European expansion. For strategic reasons, they alternated between concentrating in
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large central settlements and dispersing into widely scattered groups.104 This produced
two outcomes. First, it preserved the natural environment far better than the BritishAmerican mode of constant dense settlement.105 They maintained a nearly pristine
ecosystem (aside from disturbances caused by the fur trade) with minimal cultivation.
And secondly, it meant that natives were experienced navigators in the region—able to
retreat and attack with ease using the natural landscape to their advantage.
Before the end of the imperial wars in 1763, colonists showed little interest in
settling this native stronghold, for the entire area—the northern frontier of Massachusetts,
the northeastern frontier of New York, and the western frontier of New Hampshire—
was, in perception and reality, a constant theater of war. In March 1747, for example, the
Champlain Valley became the setting of a massive battle when Abenakis, Iroquois, and
French, as well as representatives from other native allies such as the Ottawas,
Nipissings, Winnebagoes, and Hurons, met in Montreal to discuss war against the
Mohawk enemy who were located to the west of Lake Champlain. The French
inhabitants abandoned their settlement at St. Frederic (Crown Point) for Montreal, while
those who remained prepared for war. By April, English garrisons along the New
Hampshire frontier experienced the impact of those decisions made a month prior in
Montreal. Number Four (Charleston, New Hampshire), a British frontier garrison
intended to intercept Green Mountain war parties, was attacked by French and Native
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soldiers. Captain Phineas Stevens reported the horrors: “they seemed every Minute as
though they were going to swallow us up, using all the threatening Language they could
possibly invent, with shouting & firing as if the heavens & earth were coming
together.”106 In the events that followed, a military unit marched towards Lake
Champlain seeking retribution. They were then surrounded and ambushed, and only
narrowly escaped to Fort Dummer during their retreat from the unsuccessful effort. It is
not surprising, then, that potential settlers viewed the Green Mountains as full of
danger.107
The ease with which enemy parties moved throughout the Green Mountains
continued to strike fear into the minds of English settlers. A few years later , during the
French and Indian War, it was noted that the French, along with their native allies, had
established forts around the Green Mountains and Lake Champlain where “they may
send out their Parties to kill and scalp the Inhabitants, and ruin the Frontier Counties.”
According to this particular tract, however, the Franco-Native alliance was not strictly a
northern concern. Britain’s enemies sought to take advantage of the “present disunited
State of the British Colonies, and the extreme Difficulty of bringing so many different
Governments and Assemblies to agree in any speedy and effectual measures for common
Defense and Security.” So long as colonial efforts against a common threat remained
divided, an enemy could “murder and scalp our Farmers, with their Wives and Children,
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and take an easy Possession of such Parts of the British Territory.”108 The efforts to unite
the colonies did not prevent the war from occurring, however, and the stories told by
those who had actually been to the Green Mountains further deteriorated any motivation
within others to migrate.
During the early years of the war, the imagery associated with the Green
Mountains was gruesome to say the least. One article reported a forty-day scouting
mission conducted by “Lieut. Kennedy (of the Regulars) …with some of the Mohawks
and Highlanders.” The story’s setting stretched from St. John’s River (Saint-Jean-surRichelieu) down the Champlain coast, where they encountered sights of burnt taverns,
enemy checkpoints, and human scalps.109 In another grisly story, a group of carpenters
accompanied by fifteen soldiers departed Fort Edward, New York, in the summer of
1757, and were ambushed. After a partially successful pursuit, the remaining enemies
escaped into the wilderness never to be seen again.110 While tales from frontier scouts
often used hyperbolic and brutal language, the feeling of insecurity that Englishmen felt
in the woods surrounding Lake Champlain could not be over stated. Without contrasting
stories of success, the perception of the region remained gloomy.
As the British advanced north towards the end of the war, however, victory
carried with it a new understanding of the Green Mountains for provincial governors and
colonists alike. The British chose the Champlain region as the location for a successful
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two-pronged attack in 1759: one on land “to proceed by Lake Champlain,” and the other
by water from Nova Scotia, “are to go up the River St. Lawrence.”111 As it became
evident that the British empire now possessed “all their [enemy’s] Navigation upon Lake
Champlain,” the perception of the region changed.112 The royal proclamation of 1763
granted the entire territory to the British crown. French residents of the region either
returned to Europe, immersed themselves in Native cultures, or awaited their new lives
under the domain of Britain.113 The Abenaki were severely weakened both in numbers
and morale without their French allies for assistance; those that remained now lived in
“a changing world in which the immediate presence of British settlers governed their
opinions and actions.”114
The future of the Green Mountains was altered forever as dangerous tales of the
American wilderness were suddenly replaced by the promise of industry and civilization.
Benning Wentworth was perhaps the most important figure to seize the opportunity
afforded by the Green Mountain annexation. Although his understanding of the situation
will be discussed later, his aggressive granting of cheap land to willing purchasers
profoundly and rapidly affected the demographics of the Green Mountains during the
early 1760s. Also, the people themselves experienced a sudden newfound faith in the
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region. Cheap land free of French and Indian aggression was enticing, but an even greater
attraction was that the land lay virtually untouched from their perspective. Some saw the
obstacle of cultivating and clearing land in its natural state as an expensive hindrance,
but others found the region’s untouched nature particularly inviting.

Fig. 2 From “A general map of the middle British colonies, in America; viz Virginia,
Màriland, Dèlaware, Pensilvania, New-Jersey, New-York, Connecticut, and Rhode Island:
of Aquanishuonîgy, the country of the confederate Indian…” by Lewis Evans, 1755,
Library of Congress, Maps Division, www.loc.gov/item

“It is Plain the World Never Was, Nor Ever Will Be, Without Numbers of
Men in That State”
Settlements in the Green Mountains prior to 1763 were few and far between.
Those who settled beyond frontier garrisons pursued a life of economic uncertainty, war,
and little security beyond his or her own personal abilities. After the war, however, both
50

New York and New Hampshire adopted their own distinct approaches to populating the
region. New York’s method was slow-paced and essentially feudalistic, relying on
wealthy individuals to populate, cultivate, and guide the land towards prosperity.115 This
system naturally obstructed any hope for a speedy settlement of the region, and the pace
was slowed even further with six different New York governors holding the office
between 1763 and 1775. New Hampshire, on the other hand, experienced only two:
Benning Wentworth (1741-1767) and his nephew John Wentworth (1766-1775). Under
their direction, New Hampshire practiced a polar opposite strategy: they granted smaller
tracts of land for a cheap price, and assumed that individuals would purchase the amount
of land they were able to cultivate and improve.116 Under these circumstances, migrants
with what would be known as “Hampshire Grants” had settled the region in the hundreds
by March, 1764, when New York received word from the crown that the region was
within their jurisdiction.117 New York’s inability to establish an effective civil presence,
at a time of such rapid settlement, undermined its own authority in the region.
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In 1763, the New York government received interesting news from Alexander
McLeans, a merchant of that colony. On his trip back from Canada he made a short stay
at Crown Point:
and there saw a considerable number of persons about five or six among which
were two Gentlemen said to be principal men in New Hampshire Government,
and representatives in that General Assembly and Justices of the Peace that the
rest of the Persons with them were also (as was said) of that Colony, that these
Persons declared that they came thither to Lay out Lands, and a man that appeared
to be a principal person among them Declared that Crown Point was in their
Government.118
In response, later that year New York governor Cadwallader Colden issued a
“Proclamation Declaring the Connecticut River the East Bounds of the Province of New
York.”119 The proclamation notified all “Judges, Justices, and other Civil Officers” in the
County of Albany—which encompassed the entire region up to the 45th parallel—to
continue their work under the authority of New York.
New York was forced to deal with these migrants who settled within their
jurisdiction under grants signed by a New Hampshire governor. Governor Colden asked
Sheriff Hermanus Schuyler to provide him with “the Names of all and every Person and
Persons, who under the Grants of the Government of New-Hampshire, do or shall hold
the Possession of any Lands Westward of Connecticut River.”120 While Schuyler worked
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to achieve his orders, Governor Colden wrote to the British Board of Trade in April 1764
that Wentworth had granted “160 Townships, of six miles square each” west of the
Connecticut River. Furthermore, he reported stories of “[men] in appearance no better
than a Pedlar” throughout New York and New Jersey, “hawking and selling his pretended
Rights of 30 Townships” in the region.121 Colden concluded by urging the Board of Trade
to consider an expedient response to the “perhaps [mischievous]” state of society in the
Grants region, “which may happen by the different claims of Jurisdiction.”122 In the
meantime, New York chose to fight fire with fire.
Philip Skene was a typical New York land owner in that he received large tracts
of land which he was expected to successfully settle and cultivate. By 1765, Philip Skene
had acquired a little over 20,000 acres east of Lake George, and had just returned from
Europe convincing “60 other persons” to settle there, engaging “100 families more to
come from.”123 New York’s effort is epitomized by a 1765 newspaper advertisement
submitted by Skene himself in promotion of Skenesborough. The advertisement stated
that potential settlers could acquire goods from the town of St. John’s, where “Fish and
Venison…[are] to be had in Plenty.” As well, “all Kinds of Provisions…will be sold
reasonably by the present Inhabitants to new Settlers.”124
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While New York relied on men like Philip Skene and his advertisements to attract
migrants, New Hampshire’s strategy to populate the region was in full swing. Already
having obtained an ample number of settlers under New Hampshire titles, Governor
Wentworth reassured his grantees in March 1764 that they could ignore the increasingly
aggressive claims that Hampshire residents would lose their land to New York. He stated
that Governor Colden was mistaken in his judgment and that New Hampshire “may
legally extend her western Boundary as far as the Massachusetts claim reaches.” Current
inhabitants “may not be intimidated, or any way hindered or obstructed in the
Improvement of the Land so granted”; they were “to be industrious in clearing and
cultivating their Lands agreeable to their respective grants,” ignoring New York’s
“pretended right of Jurisdiction.”125
In July 1764, after a royal order confirmed that the disputed territory belonged to
New York, establishing civil society in the region became solely New York’s
responsibility.126 It was a colonial government’s duty to ensure a community’s prosperity
and civil stability. The key players in the controversy were certainly familiar with the
work of Hobbes and Locke, and with the current concepts of what governments owed
their people. As described in the previous chapter, civil society was believed to eradicate
the fear of mistrust, ensure that unjust actions were met with just responses, and that
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one’s property was secured. Locke and Hobbes argued that the role of the state was to
enforce this stability within communities. If no state was able to provide an efficiently
stable civil society, there remained a void left to be filled. Colden was a graduate of
Edinburgh University and Wentworth a graduate of Harvard, but for the average migrant,
these concepts may not have been so clear. Many simply thought of their role in society
as being far removed from political decisions pertaining to the colony as a whole. There
were others, however, often individuals who had invested much of their wealth in
obtaining land grants, who were particularly determined to involve themselves in the
development of civil society.
The Calm Before the Storm
In August 1764, Massachusetts residents John Horsfoot and Isaac Charles
requested justice of the peace Samuel Robinson to defend the New Hampshire land titles
by evicting three settlers who had settled on land in Pownal under New York grants. 127
Robinson’s decision to do so was perhaps as much influenced by his personal interest in
New Hampshire grants as by his obedience to his duties as justice of the peace. The
Robinsons—Samuel and his sons Leonard, Samuel Jr., and Moses—were all heavily
involved with land speculation in the region, owning thousands of acres of land under
New Hampshire titles in Bennington, Shaftsbury, Rupert, Somerset, Castleton, and
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Pownal.128 To accept New York’s claim on his neighbor’s property would undermine the
legitimacy of the right to his own land.
After Robinson did his duty of clearing Hans Jurry Creiger, Peter Voss, and
Bastiane Deale from the contested land, Sheriff Schuyler in turn obeyed his governor’s
orders to “preserve the Peace” within New York’s jurisdiction by pursuing the “New
Hampshire people” who harassed the Dutch settlers. Schuyler seized Robinson, Samuel
Ashley, Horsfoot, and Charles (“the two last, pretended owners” of the land in Pownal)
and brought them to the jail in Albany.129 This event demonstrates that inhabitants
believed that securing one’s land and administering justice directly correlated with an
established civil society. As of 1764, it was legally New York’s responsibility to perform
these tasks, but their inability to legalize all grants held by actual settlers prolonged the
conflict. It was the settlers themselves who first determined that the territory was simply
too vast and the settlers too dispersed for Albany alone to govern properly.
Many inhabitants in 1765 believed if counties could be established by New York,
civil order would follow. Three petitions to the New York government led by a future
advocate of the Vermont cause, Thomas Chandler, called for the creation of legitimate
counties as “necessary for the better administration of Justice.”130 The first two petitions,
of October 9 and 15, outlined a plan for creating five separate counties in the Green
Mountains. The third petition, however, was less concerned with the logistics of
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establishing counties and instead highlighted the unfortunate state of the inhabitants’ (ungoverned) communities. Building on the two previous petitions, new counties would
make sure that “offenders be Brought to Justice, and Creditors may Recover their Just
Dues.” With language similar to that formerly employed to describe the undesirable state
of nature, the petitioners lamented that their current situation made it possible for “every
one to do what is Right in their own Eyes.” Protection was their foremost concern:
protection of their property, but even more vital, the protection of their lives. These
particular petitioners had lived “Now near Six months…without Law,” and had “made
application to be protected, but as yet [were] not answered.” The conclusion of this
petition took a dark turn when it stated that at least one murder and one kidnapping had
occurred, and if nothing was done soon, “the Land will be filled with Nothing, but Villins
and Murders.”131 The inhabitants, many of whom were willing to work with New York
out of respect for the crown’s judgment, considered direct involvement from New York
as the only way their community could succeed.
Henry Moore, Colden’s replacement as governor, responded with a more
proactive approach to the controversy upon his arrival to New York in 1765. A royal
committee met and responded to the three petitions that although the entire region up to
the forty-fifth parallel was not settled enough to establish counties, “a competent Number
of fit persons for the Conservation of the Peace and administration of Justice” ought to
be appointed.132 Hoping for a better relationship with the residents (as well as making
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sure New York’s frontier could be properly protected), the new governor then asked for
a complete list of able-bodied men, to which Samuel Robinson and Thomas Chandler
responded in late 1765 and early 1766 respectively.133 In an attempt to cool the growing
tensions and hinder any further confusion, New York created Cumberland County,
ending nearly a half-decade of “lawlessness” in the southeastern portion of the Green
Mountains. New York also granted a court of common pleas and a court of general
sessions of the peace, and for the first time received from the inhabitants their
“Nomination[s] of the Civil Authority for the County of Cumberland.”134 Recalling these
events, Governor Moore wrote in 1767 that by establishing the county of Cumberland he
hoped to begin consistently settling the region, and that once the other areas had attained
“a sufficient number of Inhabitants,” they would also receive county status.135
Moore’s objective was to legitimize the land claims of actual settlers under New
Hampshire grants while simultaneously calming the New York proprietors angry that
their lands were inhabited by people with “pretended” titles. At the time of Moore’s
arrival in New York, the entire colony was in dismay due to the passage of the highly
controversial Stamp Act. No land grants were processed at this time; for Moore “was
determined not to issue any papers except such as were stamped and the people here
refused to take them on that condition.” 136 At the same time, Moore complained that
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because the Wentworth grants were so inexpensive, entire townships “have bought and
sold, conveyed and reconveyed” to the extent that the original owners were
unidentifiable. In this situation, Governor Moore found two actions necessary. First, to
provide an opportunity for actual settlers—some of whom had “expended the whole and
others the greatest part of what they were with in purchasing the said Grants”—to receive
new patents from New York; and second, to appropriate land “on which no
Improvements had been made” to New York, and grant that land to military officers as
prescribed in the Proclamation of 1763.137 But Moore made these decisions unaware that
some of the most aggressive Yankee speculators had just arrived in the Green Mountains
with patents to land they planned on keeping without paying another pence.
Authority and its Relationship to the Concept of Sovereignty in the Grants
Region
If the events of the early- and mid-1760s were a pot of water being filled and put
on low heat, in the late 1760s the heat was turned up. As surveyor contracts were being
signed by the dozens in New York, New England settlers who purchased New Hampshire
titles were simultaneously moving their families to the exact same lands. The result of
these contemporaneous events was the infamous “ejectment trials” of the 1770s. In
January 1770, Colden, who had returned as governor, explained to colonial Secretary of
State Lord Hillsborough how the grant controversy reached this boiling point. During
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Colden’s term earlier in the decade, he wrote, he had “resolved on measures respected
these Lands which I was then assured would give entire satisfaction to [the settlers].” 138
Understanding that New York’s quit-rent prices were perhaps out of reach for the average
settler who had already bought Hampshire grants, Colden provided settlers with New
York “Grants and [left] it to themselves to pay me such proportion of my fees as they
could conveniently do…this was so agreeable [they] immediately proceeded to take the
necessary steps, for obtaining the new Grants.” Colden blamed his replacement,
Governor Moore, for the controversy’s continued existence because Moore “refused to
pass any [grants] without his full Fees [being] paid. This gave great disgust to the people,
and occasioned those applications which have since been made to the King on this
subject.” The situation was still not resolved by the end of the 1760s, and the grants
population had increased by the thousands by the time Colden was reassigned to the
governorship in 1769.
By the early 1770s, hardy settlers were determined to both create a prosperous
community and receive lands in the Green Mountains. The same wilderness that had
struck fear in potential settlers only a decade before was now seen as full of potential.
Economic opportunity was plentiful; recently annexed Quebec, full of French-Canadians
and Natives, was, from an English point of view, an untapped trade market awaiting His
Majesty’s subjects. North-flowing Lake Champlain provided easy access to the St.
Lawrence waterway for those west of the mountains, and eastern residents had access to
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the southern-flowing Connecticut River that led directly to Boston. Many envisioned the
Champlain Valley’s destiny as a flourishing port providing lumber, assorted ashes, and
furs to either the north or south, in return receiving finished luxuries from major cities.
Protecting this territory became a life-or-death matter as the Grant controversy boiled
over.
New York’s effort to establish a more fixed presence in the region coincided with
the New Hampshire authorities stepping away. Although the jurisdictional dispute
between New Hampshire and New York had been settled in 1764, settlers and speculators
continued to purchase New Hampshire titles for mere “pennies an acre” throughout the
the remaining years of the 1760s.139 By the 1770s, the legal confusion caused by the
grants led to violent conflict as New York authorities were confronted by radicalized
settlers who were willing to use physical force to defend their property.
One example of how this confusion intensified the conflict was when in January
1770, New Hampshire governor John Wentworth wrote to New York governor Colden
that as “Survey General of His Majesty’s Woods,” he reserved the right to administer
grants distributed before 1764, when New York officially received the territory.
Wentworth was specifically concerned in this letter with three family members--William
Deane, William Deane Jr., and Willard Deane—who had all received New Hampshire
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titles before 1764. All three had now been forcibly removed from their property by New
York authorities, in a move that Wentworth called unjust harassment and persecution.
This event demonstrates how royal governors were confronted by newly radicalized
Grants settlers who were willing to use violence to defend their property.
The story began in August 1769, when Benjamin Whiting received from both
Richard Maurice, the New York judge of the Court of Vice Admiralty, and Thomas
Ludlow, the Provost Marshall of New York, the “full power to execute” several writs
against the Deanes for “destroying White Pine Timber within the County of
Cumberland.” After detaining both William Deane Jr. and Willard Deane, Whiting was
confronted on multiple occasions by interested neighbors who “desired to know which
way [whiting] determined to Travell with the said Deanes to New York.” While Whiting
and his prisoners rested for the night in Marlborough (Vermont region), he encountered
“Riotous men from Brattleboro and Guilford who behaved in a Very hostile manner and
swore they would have the prisoners or pull down the house, they Tarried all night and
Dispersed the Next day.”140 Increasingly, residents of the Grants were unwilling to allow
any intrusion on the preservation of their property. Similar social networks such as the
one involved in intimidating Whiting mobilized groups of residents to protect each other
from the increasing numbers of Yorkers and Yorker-surveyors arriving in the early
1770s.
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By 1770, many Grants settlers had spent an extended period of time without a
formal hierarchical government structure (some at least a decade), and in response, they
formed localized political units based on popular support, persuasion, and force, intended
to defend their constituents’ livelihoods and property. An event that occurred in May
1770, one of the precipitating events for the infamous ejectment trials, displays how far
Grants settlers were willing to go. Daniel Whipple, High Sheriff of Cumberland, had
assembled a posse to re-capture “Joseph Wait and others who had escaped out of his
Custody” by neighbors who had come to their defense.141 Whipple’s posse of
approximately fifteen men was met by roughly forty “approaching in a Riotous
manner…who were armed with Guns, Swords, Pistols, and Clubs.” Whipple “made
Proclamation aloud in form of Law for them to Disperse,” but to no avail. John Grout, a
local resident and member of the New-York posse testified that he was “was put in fear
and Dread of his Life.” Residents who violently opposed New York authority equated
their land with their life; opposing a threat to one’s own livelihood, as both Locke and
Hobbes noted, was absolutely natural. It had been more than five years since New York
had been granted the territory, and many were skeptical about whether New York had
the concerns of actual settlers foremost. The decisions made by these residents was not
to refute New York authority, but to replace it; authority in the region was no longer
reserved for government officials, but belonged to the people themselves.
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Affidavits from the ensuing ejectment trials in Albany display how a group such
as the Green Mountain Boys was able to unify and flourish. The Green Mountain Boys
required a solid constituency that sought their protection, and finding such a group was
not difficult. Ebenezer Cole explained in his affidavit that since his arrival in 1764, there
had been at least a five-fold increase of settlers.142 Most of these new settlers had
purchased lands from original New Hampshire grantees, and their land was safe, since
the governor of New York had been ordered not to molest any current inhabitants, nor
grant any more land in the region.143 Although most migrations had occurred after the
land was officially declared New York’s, settlers still possessed legal grants signed by a
royal governor. Some of these purchasers initially acquired new legitimate titles from
New York proprietors, but for whatever reason—perhaps the high price of New York
titles or the prevention of the New York governor from signing— “they in general
changed their minds, and declared the New York Proprietors dared not to serve them.”
Once that decision had been made, “and from the common and public conversation…it
was manifest...they had confederated to support each other by Force of Arms.”144
Observed by Ethan Allen, leader of the Green Mountain Boys, resistance to New York
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authorities was absolutely necessary for the defense of all settlers on land held under
New Hampshire titles.145 The Green Mountain Boys had found their constituency.
The Green Mountain Boys also needed to work within a system their neighbors
would consider legitimate, however. According to Shaftsbury Justice of the Peace John
Munro, the Green Mountain Boys “regulated themselves by the Laws of New Hampshire,
and the Charters.”146 Simon Stevens added “that by the Law of New Hampshire every
Township chooses annually select men, and a variety of other public officers, and are
authorized to hold Town meets.”147 Thus the Green Mountain Boys organized into
traditional New England governmental structures, but by the authority of the people, and
not of the state. With the colony of New Hampshire having released its hold on this
territory, the Green Mountain Boys became the unofficial “select men” of Grant title
holders by the early 1770s. As a functioning military and governmental entity, the Green
Mountain Boys sought to replace New York authority. They justified their action with
the will of the people they served, along with their right to the land they purchased.
A conversation reported by Judge Samuel Wells of Brattleboro suggests the
extent to which the Green Mountain Boys were operating to replace New York’s
authority. Wells called upon Nathan Stone, a leader of the Green Mountain Boys, to
accompany him on a trip into town during May 1770. They discussed the increasing
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presence of New York law agents attempting to seize Grant residents, and how the
residents “opposed and threatened” the agents in response. Stone, presumably speaking
on behalf of the Boys, declared that “the making [of Cumberland] County was a sham
and not a Reality…that it was never intended that these Courts should Act in Trying
Causes, that there was no Justice to be obtained in the County.”148 Wells countered by
attempting “to Convince the said Stone of the danger of opposing the Execution of the
Laws”—that outspoken and violent opposition to the government damaged the prospect
of a amicable relationship between the people and state, which hindered the potential
more efficient (formal) avenues had for voicing duress. Perhaps the most threatening
comment from Stone came towards the end of their conversation, when Stone stated that
his opinion was not a recent resolution, but “had been fixed at least five or six months
before, and that while he had life he would oppose the Sheriff, and that the people of
[Windsor] and some other places would joine…to the last drop of their blood.” Not
everyone agreed with Stone, of course; as the continued flow of petitions to the
government of New York demonstrates, residents remained divided about New York’s
authority in the early 1770s. New York authority still warranted respect as an appendage
of Britain’s empire, but the power of both provincial governments, and the crown, was
waning.
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“That a Commonwealth, Without Sovereign Power, is But a Word,
Without Substance”
The King’s sovereignty stood on two pillars in the grants region prior to the
American Revolution. First was the New York provincial government. By 1772 the entire
region was composed of New York counties (Gloucester was created in 1770 and
Charlotte in 1772). The second power executing the King’s sovereignty was the Green
Mountain Boys. Constant encouragement for the Green Mountain Boys came from those
in favor of defending the Hampshire titles; one inhabitant, Simon Stevens, believed “that
had it not been for those Encouragements all opposition to the Government of New York
would long since have been at an End.”149 In the beginning, the Green Mountain Boys
offered only an immediate defense against New York agents, but the group evolved in
the early 1770s from a pseudo-military to a pseudo-governmental organization virtually
replacing any provincial charter of governance. By the time of the American Revolution,
it had become a generally accepted truth among Grants colonists that a sovereign’s
fundamental existence stemmed only from its ability to bring the people out of nature. It
was the people who decided whether or not a state was properly functioning, and subjects
were now the final arbiter of governmental truth. Legitimacy was completely reliant on
the consent of subjects.
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Fig. 3 From “A Map of the Province of New-York reduc’d from the larger
drawing of that Province, compiled from actual surveys by order of His
Excellency William Tyron, Esq., Captain General & Governor of the
same…” by Sauthier, Clause Joseph, 1776, Library of Congress, Maps
Division, https://www.loc.gov/resource

By the early 1770s, it had become evident that a significant portion of residents
in the Green Mountains were not willing to give in to New York’s authority. Networks
of agitators were able to organize rapid responses of support from neighbors and nearby
residents who had similar politics. When John Munro wrote to James Duane in early
November 1772, he complained that members of the Green Mountain Boys “are settling
the land all over in full confidence that they will hold it forever…do you think our king
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will pardon the…murderers?”150 Only a few weeks later Munro complained to New York
Governor William Tyron, “what can a Justice do when the whole Country combines
against him?” Munro had recently captured counterfeiters John Searles of Arlington and
Comfort Carpenter of Shaftsbury, but as he reported, they escaped with ease.
Furthermore, local inhabitants had “destroyed one of my Pot ash works,” and he
concluded that even if he were to send constables out to apprehend individuals, “the
constables will not be faithful for they are its my opinion less or more concerned [with
the counterfeiting].”151
Munro was not alone, however; there were still many settlers who desired a more
proactive and accommodating approach from New York. A solution for settlers who
remained faithful to the king’s orders of 1764 was to strengthen the relationship between
their region and the government of New York. Back in 1767, Governor Moore had
explained to Lord Shelburne that “[Cumberland County] was neither populous enough
to require such a Priviledge [of assembly members], and the expence of paying their
Members which is constantly practised in this part of the world would have been
burthensome to them so that they themselves for these reasons alone declined it.” But
Cumberland County’s circumstances changed by December 1772, when 151 residents
signed a petition to send representatives to the General Assembly—to “[establish] that
firm and lasting connection which [the petitioners] are desirous should ever subsist
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between them and the Government to which it is their happiness to belong and will enable
the more readily to accomplish the good purposes of Government.”152 In February 1773,
roughly 300 residents of Skenesborough, now within the limits of the newly established
Charlotte County, petitioned as well for a more solid connection with New York
government.153
Although by 1773, all residents in the Green Mountains legally lived within the
borders of one New York county or another, many possessed (and continued to purchase)
land grants signed under the New Hampshire seal. Inhabitants still waiting to legitimize
their land titles from Gloucester and Cumberland Counties provided the government of
New York with a clear description of their anxieties in February 1773:
That the inhabitants of [Gloucester and Cumberland] whose Titles remain
unconfirmed suffer the greatest Inconveniencies on that Account. That they
cannot carry on their Improvements with spirit and vigour from the uncertainty
whether they may not be finally deprived of them and loose their Labour. That
they are not entitled to the Rights and Privileges of Freeholders from the Defects
of their present Charters, nor can they for the same Reason support any Action
for their Landed Property when it is injured or withheld from them, That while
these distressing Circumstances fall heavy on Individuals they at the same Time
obstruct the Growth and further Cultivation of these New Counties impede the
equal Administration of Justice.
The petition expressed both psychological and systematic setbacks to their situation.
Psychologically, they could not continue working in fear that all that they had worked
for could be taken away from them at any moment--either by a New York proprietor or
by a particularly aggressive neighbor. The inefficient court and justice system in their
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respective counties made seeking justice impossible. While the Gloucester County Court
was established by New York in March 1770, for example, Judge Taplin heard only eight
cases in its first year of existence. In February, 1771, the officers were unable to conduct
court in Kingsland due to “there Being No Road and Snow very Deep.” They “concluded
we ware farr in the woods we Did not Expect to See any House” so court was
adjourned.154 Without efficient execution of the judicial process, many would
increasingly turn to the alternative method of violent, yet to many justifiable, opposition.
Authority in the Green Mountains was hotly contested. Many waited anxiously
for the validation of their grants by New York, an event that often never came. Others
took matters into their own hands. Individuals and families continued to purchase, settle,
and cultivate land northward up to the 45th Parallel, a territory virtually untouched by
Europeans before the 1770s. The Grants region still faced many obstacles in the way of
establishing a civil society, however, as the animosity between Great Britain and her
colonies increased in the mid 1770s. While some looked towards New York—and thus
the crown—as the source of legitimate sovereignty, others pursued the path of colonial
rebellion, arguing against the legitimacy of New York and ultimately also of Great
Britain’s government. (Some in the Grants argued against the legitimacy of New York
and for the legitimacy of Great Britain, but that is another story.)
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CHAPTER 3: “JUSTICE BETWEEN SOVEREIGNS”
As I showed in the first chapter, Thomas Hobbes and John Locke both
demonstrated that the experiences of Man in nature would have a significant impact on
the erection of a state. Hobbes and Locked also argued that people must sacrifice their
will to the state in order for a state to function efficiently; without that sacrifice, the state’s
laws would be mere suggestions. Inhabitants do not immediately transition from a state
of nature to civil society once a state has been created. They relinquish their free will to
the state as it proves efficient in bringing them out of nature thus increasing the state’s
authority. This chapter will examine the transition of the Hampshire Grants from a state
of nature into a civil society.
Two simultaneous processes occurred in Vermont between 1777 and 1791 that
relate directly to the concept of sovereignty. The first was the process of the Vermont
state forming and stabilizing in the midst of the American Revolution. During the
struggles in the early 1770s, the Green Mountain Boys often presented themselves as
defending the cause of the “common people” against “gentlemen, with all their
pretensions.”155 When the time came for the leaders of the Hampshire Grants to design a
state, an event many former leaders of the Boys participated in, it was essential that the
people’s ultimate authority be systematically represented in the new constitution. Once
the document was framed, the leaders became spokesmen for Vermont as they justified
its existence to both Continental and British representatives. These Vermonters held firm
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to the position that their new state was independent and autonomous on all accounts. As
leaders worked to perfect their art of governance, the Grants residents were forced to
make a decision: do they join Vermont?
The second process this chapter will discuss is the formation of a self-conscious
group of people who considered themselves Vermonters. Although the birth of Vermont
may be said to have occurred when the constitution was drafted in 1777, not all people
inhabiting the Hampshire Grants were “Vermonters” at that time. Many people living on
the east side of the Green Mountains--in what they considered to be Cumberland County,
New York--continued to petition New York’s representatives in the Continental
Congress, even after Vermont’s first General Assembly met in 1778. By 1785, however,
this uncertainty had ended: Vermont’s territorial claims had become one with its
geographic boundaries. By 1787, when talk of the United States constitution was in full
swing, the people of the Grants region now considered themselves Vermonters.
The Birth of Vermont
The leaders of the movement to defend the Hampshire Grants from New York’s
control were not erudite political theorists, they were opportunists--fairly creative and
self-reflective, but still opportunists. By 1775 the Allen brothers had acquired nearly
65,000 acres of land in the northwest territory of the Grants.156 Selling and buying land
continued in the region as residents purchased land—much of it from the Allens and their
Onion River Land Company—throughout the previously unsettled (by Europeans) areas
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of the north. Before the Revolution, the Green Mountain Boys were merely the vanguard
of a grassroots movement concerned with the protection and security of frontier settlers.
That all changed once the war broke out in 1775.
At that point, the magnitude of the Hampshire Grants controversy expanded
exponentially. Only a few months after the Green Mountain Boys captured Fort
Ticonderoga in May, 1775, their movement had become a concern for New York’s newly
organized Committee of Correspondence. The Albany Committee of Safety reported in
1775 that inhabitants of the Grants were hesitant to sign “the general Association” under
the authority of New York as part of the Continental Congress.157 In September, the
Committee of Safety acknowledged there were “Doubts and Uneasiness” amongst Grants
residents who were “apprehensive that they may…be disquieted in their Possessions and
Claims” should they join the Association. The Committee promised that if the Grants
residents joined New York, they would not be subjected to “any Controversey respecting
their Claim or Title.” Grants residents were thus provided with their first opportunity to
have their lands legitimated by New York free of charge. Still, skeptics in the Grants
region--especially those residing in New York’s Charlotte County on the west side of the
mountains--did not trust the Committee’s promise.158 Although some residents of the
Green Mountains wanted to join the New York patriots in their struggle against Great
Britain, many saw the struggle against Great Britain and New York as one and the same.
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In January of 1776, representatives from eighteen towns on the west side of the
grants met in Dorset to discuss the bargain offered to them by New York’s Committee.159
The January convention resolved to “represent the particular case of the inhabitants of
the N. Hampshire Grants to the honorable Continental Congress by Remonstrance and
petition.”160 In charge of drafting this petition were James Breckenridge, Heman Allen,
Jonas Fay, William Marsh, and Thomas Rowley. All of these men were involved with
the Green Mountain Boys movement, and James Breckenridge, the only man from this
list not in the formal ranks of the Boys, had been evicted from his land by New York
officials in 1770.161 The “Remonstrance” certainly represented a specific demographic,
and was submitted to the Continental Congress by Heman Allen in May. While the
residents waited for Allen response, in June, 1776, a “warrant” was distributed to “the
several Inhabitants of the N. Hampshire Grants” asking for representatives to come to
Dorset in the following month “to receive the report of Capt. Heman Allen,” and consider
the status of the Grants region in the Continental Congress.162 Allen had received an
unfavorable response from the Continental Congress, and returned home with the news
just before the July convention.163
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The July convention to which Allen presented this report consisted of new
representatives from west-side towns such as Cornwall, Jericho, and Monkton, but also
included representatives from Townshend, the first town that was considered “east side;”
all in all, forty-eight members representing thirty-two towns met to discuss the fate of
the Hampshire Grants.
It was this convention, in July of 1776, that initiated the process of transforming
the resistance movement against New York into an American state. The first duty of the
July convention was to read the petition submitted to the Continental Congress. The
“Remonstrance” Allen presented did not waste much time on Britain’s “efforts to bring
the inhabitants…of America, into base and servile subjection to Arbitrary Power.”
Rather, it brought attention to the “peculiar situation” which the petitioners “have for a
series of years been exercised, and are still struggling under.”164 As the petition stated:
[We] are entirely willing to do all in our Power in the General Cause, under the
Continental Congress[…]but are not willing to put ourselves under the honorable
provincial Congress of New York in such manner as might in future be
detrimental to our private property.
The petitioners emphasized that they wished to “engage in the Glorious Cause, without
fear of giving our opponents [New York] any advantage in the said Land dispute.” The
petition concluded by stating that their “Continental service” would be “as inhabitants of
said New Hampshire Grants, and not as inhabitants of the province of New York.”
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The July convention marked an official separation of the Grants residents into a
distinct community. The Remonstrance from May had only stated the Grants position in
reference to New York, without systematically replacing its authority. In July, they
initiated the systematic transition from New York to Grants control: the convention
resolved unanimously that “any person or persons, inhabitants of the New Hampshire
Grants” who chose to “subscribe and return an Association to any Committee or
Committees of Safety for either of the Counties in the province of N. York. or to the
provincial Congress thereof,” would be considered “enemies to the Common Cause of
the N. Hampshire Grants.”165 Although the previous chapter demonstrates that Grants
residents had a variety of responses to New York, the July convention was the first effort
to establish a “Common Cause” for all residents in the distinct territory.
In late 1776 and early 1777, delegates from the territory met to legitimate their
separatist agenda. In a meeting in September 1776, fifty-six delegates represented thirtysix towns “on the east and west side of the range of Green Mountains.”166 The minutes
of the September convention open with a statement of the official cause for the meeting:
although “for a series of years” the main topic of concern had been the “disingenuous
conduct of the former Colony (now the State of) New York,” they were no longer
interested in mending past grievances. At this convention, they agreed to form the
Hampshire Grants “into a separate and distinct” state. At the same time, all members,
“being legally delegated and authorized to transact the public and political affairs of the
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aforesaid District of Lands,” also agreed they would only conduct business “that shall
not be repugnant to the resolves of the honorable Continental Congress.” A meeting was
called for October, at Westminster Court House, a convention that would (the
representatives hoped) include ample representation from the New York-leaning eastside towns. After a poor showing at that October convention (missing notables like
Martin Chittenden and key representatives from Windsor and Woodstock), the group
adjourned until January of 1777. The group met in Westminster in January, but this time
included representatives of sixteen towns167 from both the east and west sides of the
Green Mountains. On January 16, the convention voted “that the district of land
commonly called and known by the name of New Hampshire Grants, be a new and
separate state; and for the future conduct themselves as such.” The convention set up a
committee composed of Nathan Clark, Ebenezer Hoisington, John Burnham, Jacob
Burton, and Thomas Chittenden to draft a formal “declaration, for a new and separate
state.”168
The purpose of the declaration was to demonstrate “the right of the inhabitants”
to establish a separate state. By establishing two natural rights, the Grants declaration
made the case that it was against human nature for the residents to remain under New
York. The stated rights were a negative description of what Hobbes and Locke believed
were the purposes of government. First, the declaration asserted that “whenever
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protection is withheld, no allegiance is due, or can of right be demanded.”169 As Hobbes
wrote: “The obligation of subjects to the sovereign, is understood to last as long, and no
longer, than the power lasteth, by which he is able to protect them.”170 The second
resolution in the declaration echoed Locke’s belief in the government’s essential duty to
protect one’s property:
That whenever the lives and properties of a part of a community have been
manifestly aimed at by either the legislative or executive authority of such
community, necessity requires a separation.
Here, the authors imitated Locke’s language in Two Treatises: “Hence it is a mistake to
think, that the supreme or legislative power of any common-wealth, can do what it will,
and dispose of the estates of the subject[.]”171 As a third argument, the Vermont
declaration asserted that their decision to erect a statewas a response to Congress’s May
1776, recommendation that “the respective assemblies and conventions of the United
Colonies, where no government, sufficient to the exigencies of their affairs has been,
heretofore, established, to adopt such government as shall[…]best conduce to the
happiness and safety of their constituents in particular, and of Americans in general.” In
conclusion, Vermonters believed “that a just right exists in this people to adopt measures
for their security,” which applied not only against the government of Great Britain, “but
also against that of New York.”

169

Legislative Directory, 102.
Leviathan, 147.
171
Two Treatises, 73.
170

79

With this declaration, the Vermont state was created, but not yet the system of
governance. At Windsor on June 4, 1777, seventy-two delegates representing twentytwo west-side towns and twenty-six east-side towns met to discuss the government of the
Grants—an overwhelming representation compared to the twenty-two men who had met
in January. At this convention, representatives named their state, which “shall hereafter
be called and known by the name of Vermont.”172 Since the declaration of separation in
January, the convention declared, “no government sufficient to the exigencies of our
affairs has been hitherto established.” It was therefore the “opinion of the representatives
of the people of [Vermont]” to “make and publish the recommendation for the express
purpose of taking up government.” The following month, in July, the first constitution of
Vermont was drafted at a convention assembled in Windsor. Thomas Chittenden was
encouraging towns early the following year to submit their ratifications; the first Vermont
General Assembly was to meet in March, 1778.173
The Constitution of 1777
It is my contention that Vermont ultimately survived the Revolution as an
independent state because the 1777 Constitution provided both the people, and the state,
an immense amount of power. This was done through a system of governance that
allowed the positions of the executive branch— “A Governor, Lieutenant-Governor, and
twelve persons”— to maintain tremendous power over the day-to-day operations of
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governance, while simultaneously providing the people with the ultimate authority to
decide who held these positions.174 The people’s constitutional power to vote was their
expression of ultimate authority, and as the historian J.R Pole noted, by the Revolution
it was believed “a constitution ought to bear some sort of direct authorization that would
place it beyond the power of government to change.”175 The 1777 Constitution provided
the executive with enough power to make important decisions immediately, and without
check; but Vermont’s founders believed the true power was ultimately in the hands of
the people, and provided them with frequent and free elections to those powerful
positions.
For Vermont framers, the most important part of the process of designing a
people-oriented government was to identify the rights of the state’s inhabitants, and
although the delineation of these natural rights was somewhat abstract, they were at least
deeply rooted in the experience of the Grants controversy. (New York’s 1776
constitution, in contrast, contained no Bill of Rights.) “Men were born equally free and
independent,” the framers wrote. Drawing on the idea of Man’s unlimited free will, or
unlimited right, in nature, there were “certain natural, [and] inherent[…]rights” that no
state could act against.176 Vermonters thus agreed to have the original and comprehensive
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right replaced with just a few “unalienable” ones. The constitution defined these rights
as “the enjoying and defending of life and liberty; acquiring, possessing, and protecting
property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety.”177 They added the right to
acquire, possess, and protect one’s property to the Declaration of Independence’s “life,
liberty and the pursuit of happiness”—after all, it was the protection of property acquired
and possessed that had caused Grants inhabitants to oppose New York authority in the
first place. These were rights the 1777 Constitution provided all “inhabitants of the state
of Vermont.”
To some inhabitants, however, more rights were granted. The “freemen” of
Vermont received systematic inclusion on behalf of the sovereign people in the process
of governance. Any male at least 21 years old, who had lived in Vermont for a minimum
of one year before elections, of “quiet and peaceable behavior,” was eligible to vote in
Vermont’s annual elections.178 Before actually participating in the elections, however,
those eligible were required to take an oath swearing their allegiance to the duty of
voting—“as established by the constitution.”179 Voters consented to the system of
governance by taking the oath, and then actively participated in their role. Hobbes
discussed oaths in his chapter “On the Liberty of Subjects.” By consenting to the
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sovereign state, “I authorize, or take upon me, all his actions.”180 Locke went a bit deeper
in describing an individual’s ability to authorize the state’s power. It was first necessary
to establish the “capacity” for an individual to know the laws of their land. The individual
is no longer under his guardian’s protection, “the father and son are equally free…equally
subjects of the same law together.”181 The requisites set for one to take the oath in
Vermont (age of 21, etc.) established what the state deemed was the standard of a
“freeman.” Once the freemen had voted, however, the elected representatives assumed
every bit of the people’s sovereign power.
The constitution gave the executive control over nearly all aspects of authority.
After voting, the people theoretically retained their “undubitable, unalienable and
indefeasible right, to reform, alter or abolish government,” but doing so now ran the risk
of being labelled treason.182 Although, as Locke would have approved, the “supreme
legislative power” was given to the legislature, the supreme executive power—including
the right to correct the final draft of any future legislation—was reserved for the
“Governor and Council.”183 Just to name a few additional powers, the executive had the
rights to “supply every vacancy in any office” on the occasion of “death, resignation,
removal or disqualification,” to “correspond with other States,” and to “lay embargoes.”
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The executive’s responsibility, in other words, was one big elastic clause established so
that paternalistic “spokesmen” could make decisions they viewed as necessary and
proper on behalf of every Vermonter. All final decisions, including those that concerned
legislation, were made by these fourteen individuals annually elected.
Within its historical context, the voting power each “freeman” received was
immense and unusually progressive. The Vermont definition of a freeman,
contemporarily speaking, reserved a profound acknowledgement of the voter’s ability to
reason. Compared to the Pennsylvania constitution, which comes closest to the
democratic egalitarianism of Vermont’s, the voters of Vermont had considerably more
power.185 In Vermont, voters received fourteen distinct opportunities each year to vote
for positions that possessed an immense amount of decision-making power;
Pennsylvanians only elected three or four representatives (depending on their district)
every two or three years.186 The system was traditional in the sense that government
officials often possessed a significant amount of landed interest in the future success of
the state, but was progressive in that once a year those individuals willingly accepted an
opportunity for the people to strip them of their power.187
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“Justice Between Sovereigns”: The Haldimand Negotiations
The Haldimand Negotiations provide a case study to illuminate the relationship
between the executive and the people. Geo-political interests split the state during this
period, which created what historian Peter Onuf has described as “a highly interested and
calculated species of “loyalism.””188 By the early 1780s, west-side residents, a handful
of whom had purchased lands under New Hampshire titles from the Allens, were
increasingly involved with Canadian (and thus British) commerce. This group took the
opportunity to acquire cheap land in the north, extending Vermont’s actual settlement
boundaries to its proclaimed political ones at the 45th Parallel. The promise of
establishing a foreign port on the lake in the north, similar to those in New York and
Boston, could not be realized without friendly relations with Quebec, whose location in
the St. Lawrence trade system extended from Lake Superior through the Great Lakes and
into the St. Lawrence River, ultimately leading to Atlantic ports in Canada. Not all
Vermonters benefitted from the proposed development of the north, however. While the
center of the struggle for Vermont had always been located roughly in the vicinity of the
Allens in the south- and mid-western part of the state, the Vermont state inherited
territory on both sides of the Green Mountains after the union in 1777. Along the
Connecticut River, economic interests were invested in the port of Boston.
The Haldimand negotiations themselves were a series of communications
between Frederick Haldimand, governor of the province of Quebec, and Vermont
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executive members Martin Chittenden (Williston), Jonas Fay (Bennington), and Ira Allen
(Colchester), with the assistance of their hired messenger, Ethan Allen. As members of
the executive, the elected officials possessed the power to correspond with other states
as representatives of the entire Vermont state.190 The language employed by Vermont’s
leaders in general during the time period when the negotiations were underway
frequently emphasized the independent status of the state. They reminded representatives
of both Great Britain and the United States that they had no political ties to either. In the
Continental Congress, Vermont’s right to exist was continually challenged by the still
annoyed New York officials.191 Britain, on the other hand, was willing to offer Vermont
the status of a sovereign colony in her American empire, should Vermont support British
war efforts.192 Given this context, the Vermont executive successfully fulfilled its duty
to Vermonters by protecting the existence of Vermont through negotiations with the
British. Just as Descartes noted to Elizabeth in 1646 that there existed a distinct code of
ethics reserved for states and their leaders, Vermont executives acted on a distinct
“justice between Sovereigns” during the Haldimand negotiations.
Although he was not a member of the Vermont executive, Ethan Allen was extralegally involved with the Haldimand negotiations as a messenger and assigned
representative. In his correspondence with both the Continental and British states, he was
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careful to uphold Vermont’s state sovereignty. He reminded Major Christopher Carleton,
who had led a force of natives and British regulars “on a mission of destruction” in the
Champlain Valley in 1778, that any deal between the Vermont executive and Frederick
Haldimand “respects Vermont, exclusive of any Connections whatever with the United
States, with whom this state are wholly unconnected, and who are, and for a long Time
have been in a Spirited Controversy with the State of New York.”193 Allen’s ability to
speak on behalf of the Vermont state was extra-legal, but his language represents the
contemporary understanding of independence that radiated from Vermont.
The negotiations intensified in the fall of 1780, when Ethan Allen was approached
by Beverley Robinson, a representative of the British state who had been confused, but
delighted, when the Vermont militia, led by General Allen, allowed a British convoy to
march south from Canada without interference.194 Speaking on behalf of the British state,
Beverley supposed Vermont was joining the British cause after all:
I have never had an answer from you; but the frequent Accounts we have had for
3 Months past from your part of the Country Confirms me in the Opinion I had
of yr inclination to join the Kings Cause and to assist in Restoring America to her
former peacible & happy Constitution.
Ethan Allen received this letter from Robinson in February 1781. In the text above,
Robinson refers to a letter he made sure was hand delivered in July 1780, to which there
had been no response. The lack of response was because Allen had “immediately
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brought” the letter to a “secret discussion” with the Vermont executive.195 The executive,
in turn, kept the letter secret from both the Continental Congress and the people of
Vermont for nearly eight months.
During those eight months, the Vermont executive deliberated about whether
they might best protect Vermont’s independence by allying with Britain or with the
colonies. In the letter from Robinson, who spoke for the British authorities, Allen was
assured that if Vermont were to assist “in unit[ing] America again to Great Britain, &
restoring that happy Constitution we have So wantonly & unadvisedly Destroyed,” the
state would be recognized as an independent province. Referring to himself as an
“American,” Robinson stressed the detrimental effects of the war on “peace & that mild
& good government” guaranteed by British rule. Robinson intended their correspondence
to remain strictly private, and asked Allen to “Send a friend of yr own here with proposals
to the General [Haldimand].” There is no evidence that Allen ever responded to
Robinson’s questions about Vermont’s allegiance, but when Allen submitted these letters
to the Continental Congress almost a year later in March, 1781, he did remind Samuel
Huntington, a representative from Connecticut, that Vermont had “an Indubitable Right
to agree on terms of Cessation of Hostilities with Great Briton Provided the United States
Persist in Rejecting her Application for a Union with them.”196 States, as an “artificiall
Man,” according to Hobbes, possessed the freedom to act on their own will.197
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Throughout the negotiations members of the executive did not forget it was the
people who possessed ultimate authority in the Vermont state. Ira Allen made this point
clear to Frederick Haldimand in July, 1781, after their correspondence had “become the
topick of Discourse Through the United States.” 198 He explained that although Vermont
planned to send representatives to the Continental Congress, it seemed apparent that
Congress intended “Nothing more than to Keep this State in Suspense to the End of the
war and then Divide her territory amongst the Claiming States (which is Doubtless the
intention of many).” Allen supposed that once “another denial from Congress” was made
public, the “popular bodies” in Vermont would turn against Congress, guaranteeing the
re-election of the current pro-Canadian executive. This would “make a Revolution So
long wished for by many.” 200 The “Revolution” Allen referred to was not political or
military, but social. If the freemen of Vermont knew that Congress had rejected a request
for statehood, Allen believed they would turn against the prospects of union with the new
United States. The strategy pursued during the negotiations rested on the belief that
neither New York nor the Continental Congress would go on the offensive against a
territory Britain recognized as a legitimate ally. The policy, ideally, would permit
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Vermont to “remain a Reasonable Time in a State of Nutrality,” allowing the
development of civil society.201
The Haldimand negotiations were deemed a necessity for the Vermont state’s
survival. In early 1782, most likely in anticipation of the Haldimand Negotiations going
public, Jonas Fay, Ira Allen, and Abel Curtis asked The Freeman’s Journal of
Philadelphia to publish a copy of a remonstrance submitted to the Continental Congress
back in 1780. They desired newspaper readers as far away as Philidelphia to learn that
the course Congress was pursuing in regard to Vermont deviated from “every principle
of the law of nature or nations.”202 Vermont, according to the remonstrance, deserved a
fair hearing for their case:
For if the dispute is between the states claiming on the one part, and the state of
Vermont on the other, whether the latter be a state de jure, or an independent
jurisdiction de facto, they ought to be so considered in the course of the dispute,
till the power interposing have determined whether the latter be an independent
jurisdiction de jure.203
The Vermont state was not willing to give up the “men and money we have expended,”
and they were not willing to be considered “in the specious pretext of rioters tortuously
assuming government.” The representatives of Vermont felt “they [could] no longer sit
as idle spectators without betraying the trust reposed in them.” If they willingly accepted
Congress’ decision to deny Vermont’s existence, Vermont would essentially be “denying
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itself”—something according to Descartes no human could do, and according to Locke
and Hobbes no state entrusted with the preservation of a people could do.
Perhaps the most significant aspect of the conclusion to the Haldimand
negotiations was that Vermonters remained overwhelmingly supportive of the concept
of a Vermont state. New York’s continuous refusal to effectively answer local grievances
during the early years of the Vermont state—including a rather solemn-toned
proclamation from its government in 1781 that will be discussed below—coincided with
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the political fervor in Vermont produced when the Haldimand negotiations became
public knowledge.204 Rather than cause Vermonters to turn against the Vermont system,
the Haldimand negotiations caused an increasing amount of involvement in Vermont
governance. This was catalyzed partly by a second wave of east-siders formerly loyal to
New York.

The Conclusion of the Grants Controversy
In order to be a fully independent state, it was vital that Vermont remove all ties
between its inhabitants and the government of New York. There were still two different
kinds of people living in the state after the state conventions of 1777: those who
supported the new Vermont state, and those who resided in the territory claimed by
Vermont, yet remaining loyal to New York. Even after the state conventions of 1777
had gone far toward creating an independent state, New York still attempted to hold on
to the loyalties of residents in the Hampshire Grants. Inhabitants did what they
considered necessary for survival as they granted either New York or Vermont their
individual sovereignty.
The Resolutions of the Council of Safety of New York show that New York
officers first became aware “that many people in the Eastern district of this State are
endeavoring to erect the same into a separate & independent State” in July, 1777.205
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Exactly how many people were “endeavoring” to do that is difficult to say, but one can
assume from the sheer panic expressed by both the New York government and its loyal
inhabitants in the Grants that it was an overwhelming number. The severity of the
situation was such that New York governor George Clinton issued a radical declaration
in early 1778. Governor Clinton was fairly objective in his analysis of the origins of the
current situation in the Grants.206 The “contest,” he wrote, had been the fault of the
provincial governments from both New Hampshire and New York: New York’s higher
quit-rent was unwelcome to those with “original grants under New-Hampshire or
Massachusetts Bay,” and to defend their property, residents had resorted to violence. In
response to the growing “disaffection,” Clinton wrote, “the legislature of the late Colony
of New York,” on March 9, 1774, had passed “An Act for preventing tumultuous and
riotous assemblies.” Now, Clinton offered “an absolute and unconditional discharge,
and remission of all prosecutions, penalties and forfeitures” initiated under the 1774 Act.
In return, he asked that inhabitants accept the following measures:
1st. That all persons actually possessing and improving lands…under New
Hampshire or Massachusetts-Bay…be confirmed.
2nd. All persons actually possessing and improving lands, not granted by either of
the three governments, shall be confirmed…together with such additional
quantity of vacant land, lying contiguous to each respective possession, as may
be necessary to form the same into a convenient farm[.]
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The following six articles involved taxes and rents still to be paid upon a grantee’s
confirmation of their land, however. New York was still not willing to freely give up a
territory that would have been an advantageous boost to their economy during the war.
Clinton concluded his declaration by directing residents to revoke any allegiance they
have offered to Vermont, and instead direct their allegiance to New York, which by “law
and of right they owe to this state.” Ultimately Clinton’s offer was the same one Grants
residents had heard for years: their land deeds would be confirmed, but they had to pay.
The response to the governor’s declaration was not marked with the “obedience
and allegiance” the governor had hoped for. Residents from Durham, in the southern tip
of Charlotte County, New York, for example, immediately petitioned the government
respecting the complexity of their situation. They stated that in the past, their New York
titles had been deemed worthless by separatists, and in consequence they were
“compelled to purchase the New Hampshire title to their Lands under Penalty of being
turned out of their possessions by a Mob.”207 Some of the petitioners had been banished
by “Col Ethan Allen,” and then prevented from returning to their lands when “Mr.
Thomas Chittenden (the Governor of the said pretended State)” labeled them “old
Yorker[s].” The patience of these residents loyal to New York was disintegrating:
Your Petitioners therefore most humbly pray that this honorable House will take
into their serious Consideration the unfortunate & distressed Situation of your
Petitioners and others who continue loyal to the State of New York, & take
measures for effectually defending the Persons and Property of your subjects.208
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This petition was then followed by another of similar content from Cumberland County
in May of 1779. The increased anxiety in the documents appears to be due to the fact that
upon his return from British capture, Ethan Allen was appointed judge of Bennington
County in 1778, and immediately got to work on a (perhaps personal) vendetta against
loyalist landowners. Seventy parcels of confiscated land were sold in Vermont in less
than a year between March 1778 and February 1779.209
An answer to the Yorker petitions was provided in June from the Continental
Congress. In fear that inhabitants would not serve in frontier militias under the new
Vermont state, Congress requested that individuals take their “Turn of Militia Duty for
the Defence of the frontiers,” even if it was demanded by the “Authority of the State of
Vermont.”210 These residents loyal to New York were then assured “by interposition of
Congress a happy Accommodation of all Differences in a short Time.” In an effort to
ease the tensions, Congress reported to the petitioners that they had received an assurance
from “Governor Chittenden that [Yorkers] shall not be molested.” Congress’s final
request was for inhabitants to behave “quietly and orderly while the measures for
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Pacification are on foot.”211 An authority asking for patience was something inhabitants
were probably all too acquainted with.
In addition to obtaining the promise from Chittenden, Congress assigned John
Atlee and John Witherspoon to look into the Grants controversy. Atlee and Witherspoon
submitted eleven questions to Thomas Chittenden, titled “Queries of the Committee of
Congress,” in an effort to better understand the perspective of the Vermont state and its
supporters.212 The general theme of Chittenden’s response was that Vermonters had
acted with a sincere concern that New York could not effectively provide for the
residents. Chittenden stated that Vermonters were as “unwilling to be under the
Jurisdiction of New York as we can conceive America would be to revert back under the
Power of Great Britain.” “Experience” had taught Vermonters that “it would greatly
impede the settlement of this Country to have it affixed to New York.”213 The response
Chittenden provided on behalf of Vermont was clear: Vermont was to be independent no
matter what.
In the early 1780s, petitions from Vermont flooded the New York government in
a way that resembled the period of the late 1760s and early 1770s. No longer were
petitions submitted under the title of counties: they came at an accelerated rate from the
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individual towns—a trend that deserves further analysis. A petition from Danville, New
York, dated March 1782, claimed that there were “Numbers of familys now among us
who have scarce one Bushel of Grain.”214 This distressed situation the petitioners blamed
on a political cause: “the Insenuation of Artfull and Designing men [that] your Petitioners
were Seduced to Swerve…allegiance” away from New York. The swerve of allegiance
was necessary to keep their livelihoods. As a petition from White Creek, New York,
stated, they had “swerved” their allegiance but remained “allways in rediness to oppose
our Enemy”— the Vermont state.215 These loyal towns were only doing as Governor
Clinton wished: they conducted themselves “with Prudence towards the Revolters,” and
only submitted “where there [was] no alternative left between submission & inivitable
Ruin.”216
Governor Clinton addressed the inhabitants of Cumberland County in 1782 for
the last time. With a regretful tone, he asked his subjects to “persevere in the peaceable
Line of Conduct.”217 The towns gave up submitting their grievances to the New York
government. By 1781, as Vermont divided two into five counties, a newly established
court system was able to serve the people who had been deprived of such efficient civil
services under New York. The Vermont legal system gained significant support from
individuals who were actively using the institution. In the single year of 1781,
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Bennington and Windham Counties alone saw 176 cases, and over one-tenth of male
adults were seen in court the following year when 250 cases were brought before the
same counties.218
After Clinton’s address in 1782, the final document recorded in the “Papers
Relating to the Difficulties Between New York and New Hampshire” was from
“Vermont Sufferers” who sought retribution in 1786. Their appeal summarized the lives
of Grants inhabitants who were loyal to the New York government after the Vermont
state was established. They had “sacrificed their all, suffered such exquisite Tortures,
Banishments, Imprisonments in loathsome Gaols, half starved, and threatened with being
put to Ignominious Deaths[.]”219 It is beyond the extent of this thesis to verify whether
or not all of the 1786 petitioners were properly compensated when the Vermont state
completed payment of its debt to New York in 1799.220
The Council of Censors
In October of 1783, only a month after the Revolutionary War came to an official
end, the Vermont legislature moved forward with plans “to begin the settlement of new
lands, that have been prevented by the late war between Great-Britain and America.”221
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For those still not ready to take the oath of loyalty to Vermont, a taste of Yorkers’ old
medicine was practiced in October when Vermont declared that if any inhabitant
remained in opposition to Vermont authority, like those “of Windham, to the greater
disturbance of the peace, [that] have banded together,” a precedent was now in full effect
to station “able” and “Effective men” to “assist the officers of government” in executing
Vermont law. That there is an apparent disappearance of Yorkers by the end of the war
suggests that these inhabitants either kept quiet in fear of punishment by the state, were
forcefully evicted, or accepted Vermont and focused their political energy towards its
government. By 1785, when the Council of Censors was up for election, the Vermont
state was functioning effectively and it appears that inhabitants were unable to ignore
this fact.
The Council of Censors is described in the final article of the 1777 Constitution.
So “the freedom of this Commonwealth may be preserved inviolate, forever,” the article
mandated that in the year 1785, and every seven years after, “thirteen persons, who shall
be chosen in the same manner the council is chosen—except that they shall not be out of
the Council or General Assembly,” were to convene and discuss three topics pertaining
to the functioning of the Vermont state: to assess the conduct of the executive and
legislative branches; to investigate the civil administration of justice, e.g., to ascertain
that “taxes have been justly laid and collected”; and to make sure the laws have been
“duly executed.”222 In addition to these duties, the Council of Censors had the ability to
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“meet within two years after their sitting” and decide whether or not the constitution “has
been preserved inviolate in every part.”223
The Vermont Gazette published an act of legislation in late 1784 requiring
constables to announce to the towns at least “twelve days before the last Wednesday in
March next” the election of the Censors.224 It was further enacted by the General
Assembly that the elected Censors were to meet in Norwich, Vermont, an east-side town
along the Connecticut River.225 By the end of 1785, the Censors had already ordered the
publication and distribution of three hundred copies of a set of proposed constitutional
revisions. These would be brought to the legislature for revision and adoption.226 Two
newspapers were now being published in the state, a luxury not available in 1777, so the
proposed revisions to the constitution could be widely distributed. In January 1786, the
revisions were published in The Vermont Gazette.227 The Censors then ordered that “one
thousand Copies of the Draft…be printed for the Perusal and consideration of the
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People;” copies were available at the printing offices of The Vermont Journal by
March.228
The records and revisions of the Council of Censors demonstrate a primary
concern with the apparent arbitrariness of the Vermont state under the 1777 constitution.
Of the fifteen resolutions made by the Council, nine were involved with the “severity”
of punishments, or the imbalance of state powers.229 One legislative act of February 1779,
entitled “An act to prevent riots, disorders, and contempt of authority within this State,”
was deemed by the Censors to be “unjust and impolitic,” as well as “prejudicial to the
peace of society.”230 The Censors also proposed to restrict the power of the freemen’s
vote. No longer would elections to the executive council be made at large, but “chosen
from each county in the State, by freemen residing in the same county.”231 In addition to
election alterations, the revised constitution frequently included the words “in a legal
way” following the enumerated powers of the people. For example, in the 1777
Constitution, Article V of the Rights of Inhabitants stated that “all power being originally
inherent in, and consequently, derived from the people…therefore, all officers of
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government” were “at all times accountable to them.” The revised article stated that
officers were “at all times, in a legal way, accountable to them.”232
The polemics surrounding promissory notes and the Vermont legal system serve
as a fitting anecdote to illuminate the significance of the Censors’ work for Vermonters.
The exchange in kind and notes was well established in the state by 1784. For example,
William Blodget advertised an assortment of goods in November 1784, for which he was
willing to receive:
Public securities of all kinds, of the states of Massachusetts and Rhode Island,
Peirce’s and Imlay’s Notes, Furs of all sorts, Cash, Flour, Wheat, Rye, Oats, Corn,
Butter, Cheese, Pot Ash, Beans, Peas, Flax Seed and Ginsang if very dry and
good.233
The promissory notes that belonged to Peirce and Imlay above were a common form of
exchange. A typical note would involve one party’s promise to pay the other, signed,
dated, and usually witnessed. During the early years of Vermont, these promissory notes
grounded the state’s economy, but according to a commentary in Spooner’s Vermont
Journal, the promissory system had been corrupted by May of 1785.234 From Hartford,
the author wrote that it was “very fashionable” for inhabitants to be “forging and selling
private notes of hand.”235 The report provided an example: “five or six of these forged
notes have been brought to a gentleman in Middletown, who has not a note against him
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on earth.” Trust amongst the Vermont people was disintegrating, and it was perhaps for
this reason that polemics surrounding the Censors’ actions most notably concerned the
empowerment of the Vermont state. Supporters of the revisions to the Constitution
wanted a tightening of the Vermont system, but the last thing many debtors or
counterfeiters would have liked, since they were already in a vulnerable legal position,
was for the Censors to initiate a systematic strengthening of the state.

Fig. 5 “Cambridge Nov 5, 1788. For value received I promise to pay Mrs. Margaret Emery on Order, Nine
pounds, six shillings & two pence [?] on demand, with interest till paid,” Williams, Samuel, "Promissory
note to Margaret Emery," 11/5/1778, Samuel Williams Papers, 2-24, Special Collections, University of
Vermont Library.

Public creditors were one group that was particularly enthusiastic about the
Censors’ proposed constitutional revisions. “Observer,” clearly of the crediting class,
lamented that “the numberless actions that are bro’t before the courts on promissory
notes, clear and evidently binding, is one great source of poverty to our state.”236 Mark
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G. Schmeller in Invisible Sovereign has demonstrated that the concept of credit in early
America was closely related to the “public opinion” about trust. Economic relationships
are ones where “the debtor is beholden to the creditor, but the creditor is interested in the
debtor’s financial prospects.”237 Observer’s fundamental complaint about the current
Vermont state was that its crediting system was inadequate, a problem many early
governments struggled with. A clear connection with Hobbes’s notion of trust is evident
in Observer’s complaint that Vermonters were “evading the just compliance of their
contract with each other.” Public creditors in Vermont, like Observer, whose “vested
interests fostered an attentive yet cautious political attitude,” instilled an amount of faith
in their fellow Vermonters that was certainly not present in the late 1770s.238
The concluding remarks of the Censors signified a new era of political feeling in
Vermont. After the Censors had finished setting out the proposed revisions of the
function and system of the state, they gave thanks the initial founders. It was these
“husbandmen, unexperienced in the arts of governing” who were responsible for
Vermont’s existence. And although the Censors were “obliged to check” the system these
men erected, they confessed:
[Vermont] is much indebted, even for its present existence as a separate
community, to that undaunted firmness, and prudent vigilance for the public
safety…At open war with the most potent nation in Europe;--frequently
threatened with invasions from a sister State, and, by her insidious arts, a
powerful disaffection fomented within the bowels of this commonwealth.239
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The success of the Council of Censors signified a new epoch in Vermont’s existence as
an independent republic. The Vermont state, along with its people, had survived one
constitutional cycle as established by the 1777 constitution. Inhabitants of the Green
Mountains were thankful for their state: public toasts published by the Vermont Gazette
for the 1786 New Year celebrated not only the tenth year of “Independence of the United
States,” but also “the Ninth of the Sovereignty and Independence of Vermont.”240
Vermonters and the Revised Constitution
For the pseudonymous author Observer, there was hope in the Council of
Censors. It was the Censors who could alter “the countenance which the laws give to this
baneful evil,” but only if the Censors’ work was better “calculated to the nature of the
people, and our situation.” Observer’s perspective is most likely that of a former Yorker,
one who had only recently altered his political allegiance from New York to Vermont.
This author’s approval of the Censors’ work to straighten out credit problems would not
be shared by debtors who relied on small-scale commercial exchange and promissory
notes for their livelihood.
The burgeoning newspaper culture offered a setting for polemical political
discourse. The publishers of the Vermont Gazette, for example, announced their distress
at hearing “from Poultney” that inhabitants “were burning the Constitution, as revised by
the Council of Censors.”241 It was left to the readers to decide who was ultimately
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responsible for the disrespect paid to “the unfortunate pamphlet.” The publishers of the
Gazette did suggest, however, that it was perhaps an act of the “first Magistrates,” who
they suggested opposed the “article limit[ing] the time for which any particular person
may be eligible as governor.”242 Similarly, correspondent “K. L.” wished to remind
readers of Spooner’s Vermont Journal that unless the new revisions were adopted,
we shall discover to the neighbouring States, and to the whole world, that we have
lost, not only the sight of one eye, but have shut the other against that
improvement which was designed, and will contribute to the benefit and
importance of the State of Vermont.243
The loss of the “sight of one eye” was undoubtedly a reference to Vermont’s recent
failure to gain admission to the Union, and the shutting of “the other” described what
would happen if the people did not support the revision of Vermont’s constitution.
According to the publishers of the Vermont Gazette—one of two contemporary Vermont
newspapers—the efficiency of the constitution, and thus the governing system of the
Vermont state, was dependent on the acceptance of the Council of Censors’ revision.
Although newspapers were at the disposal of residents who had both political and
geographic access to the printers, other residents resorted to more colorful and more
violent methods to have their voice heard. Jeffrey L. Parsley has noted that in
Massachusetts during the 1780s there existed an “older political paradigm that
incorporated physical resistance to government as a live option for democratic
expression.” This “older political paradigm” could certainly be found in the Green
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Mountain Boys during the 1770s. It emerged yet again in Vermont shortly after the 1786
revisions were passed into law, when on October 31, a mob interposed at the Windsor
courthouse. 244
A month later, on November 21, soon after the daily adjournment at 2:00 p.m,
“several persons, who called themselves a committee from the people, waited on the
judges of the court, with a petition requesting” that they adjourn until further notice.245
Having not received the response they were hoping for, “with an armed force they took
possession of the court-house, [and] sent dispatches for a reinforcement of their party.”
Although they retreated, the mob was said to have been led by Captain Benjamin Cooley
of Pittsford, who served under Ethan Allen and Seth Warner during the Revolutionary
war, and Thomas Lee, who had also spent time under Warner’s command. The evidence
suggests that some members of the former Green Mountain Boys saw their authority
waning, and acted in a manner that had served them well a decade earlier.
Although it was true that former Yorkers were developing a new faith in Vermont
at the time of the Council of Censors, the political voice of east-siders in the Vermont
state was not yet fully represented. That Vermont approached the United States
Constitutional Convention as a unified Vermont state, composed entirely of Vermonters,
is shown by the systematic participation and ascendency of east-siders after 1785.
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Although violent and polemic modes of disapproval sprouted after the revised
constitution was published, a critical aspect of the effective instalment of a state was
attained by Vermont after 1785: the systematic representation of all eligible freemen. The
insurgence of political opposition— “based on a combination of conviction and interest,
led by Isaac Tichenor and Nathaniel Chipman” —against the west-side dominance of
Vermont governance had begun to emerge as early as 1785.246 Before the 1785 elections,
the only east-side representatives in the executive branch were Deputy Governor
(Hartland) and Councilors from Townshend, Pomfret, Woodstock and Norwich, four
towns since their land was claimed by Vermont (under the Hampshire Grants title) eight
years prior. After the 1785 election, however, there was a proliferation of representation
from the east side. Members from West Fairlee, Addison, Vernon, Newbury, and
Newfane were elected to Councilor positions between 1785 and 1789. Finally, in 1789,
Thomas Chittenden, who had held the position of Governor since 1778, was replaced.
Chittenden’s replacement signified that the wedge which had begun to destabilize
the west-side hegemony in 1785 had finally reached the top.247 At this point the Vermont
state had systematically, and in practice, enfranchised the entire freemen populace.
Although by no means a perfect and harmonious relationship, the state and the freemen
of Vermont were from then on considered one; Vermont was no longer a “pretended”
state. This complete form of sovereignty in Vermont was established just in time to
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confront the United States Constitutional Convention—when the concept of sovereignty
in western thought was systematically changed in ways that truly expanded the concept
in innovative, but not necessarily progressive, directions.
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Conclusion
Using a case study to draw local concepts of sovereignty into larger discussions
of human nature is simply an alternative perspective on the same events Vermont
historians have examined for the past two centuries. In the case of Vermont, the notions
that humans have free will, and that individuals are their own sovereigns, were
fundamental to systematically defining the state’s authority. It was a fundamental belief
of the creators of the state that humans will naturally rise against anything that hinders
their desires—whatever those may be. This was the standard of its government, and its
representatives stood firm in their position on sovereignty against internal and external
threats.
The Constitution of the United States brought a different kind of threat to
Vermont sovereignty. The inherent hierarchical structure necessary for the federal
government to have any authority threatened the aggregate power of the Vermont
constitution. The United States government, by the nature of its institution, was an elite
governing system erected so that the common causes of the American states —as defined
by the U.S Constitution—could be defended within their territories. Admission into the
United States initiated a new epoch in the history of the concept of sovereignty in
Vermont, but the United States’ system, in its totality, also marked the dawn of a new
epoch for the concept of sovereignty in universal thought.248
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After the first Congress in June 1791, Thomas Jefferson and James Madison
vacationed in the northern territory, which included a trip to the recently admitted
fourteenth state, Vermont. Having only entered the Union a few months prior in March,
Vermonters were hopeful that this visit would symbolize unity and a tight-knit
relationship between the federal government and its states. Spooner’s Vermont Journal
explained the political importance of such a trip, hoping that “the President of the United
States…obtains useful knowledge, perhaps otherwise unobtainable, and while he
enriches his mind, secures the affections of his people.”249 The president, via his officials
Jefferson and Madison, was expected to actively secure “the affections of his people.”
Supreme authority was no longer found in the titles of office, but in the souls of
individuals. The United States had established a universal standard—one it still claims
to live by today—that a government’s authority must systematically be derived directly
from the people at large.
Vermonters in the northern portion of the state, however, were not as willing to
submit to the authority of the United States. The Vermont historian Paul S. Gillies has
suggested three themes for examining how Vermont “adjusted to its new role as the
fourteenth state:” the first is to pay particular attention to the “cost of settling up with the
past,” which includes both their payment to New York (they never got away with their
land for free after all) and the shared cost of the war with Great Britain; second is the
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constitutional adjustment described above; and third is jurisdictional.250 Commenting for
a brief moment on the jurisdictional theme is how I would like to conclude this project.
In Leviathan, Hobbes provided a strict understanding of sovereign jurisdiction.
He argued, with his typical absolutism, that sovereign power “cannot, without [the
sovereign’s] consent, be transferred to another.”251 Unless, of course, there was “A
Common-wealth by acquisition,” where “the sovereign power is acquired by force.” For
this new entity to be considered “sovereign,” however, required the event of individuals
coming together and “by plurality of voices, for fear of death, or bonds, do authorize all
actions of that man, or assembly, that hath their lives and liberty in his power.” The
difference here is that individuals consent to the new sovereign because it is the entity
“they are afraid of:” these covenants “proceed from fear of death, or violence, void
[sic]…”252 For Hobbes, the transition of sovereign authority involved consent as a zero
sum event in which the moment one provides consent a new sovereign is immediately
established.
Locke, on the other hand, divided consent into two distinct categories of
“express” and “tacit.”253 The definition of express consent, Locke argued, “nobody
doubts…makes him a perfect member of that society, a subject of that government.” But
there was an issue with “what ought to be looked upon as a tacit consent.” How could
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consent be evaluated “where he has made no expressions of it at all”? Locke begins with
the traditional absolutist view posited by Hobbes: “every man, that hath any possessions,
or enjoyment, of any part of the dominions of any government, doth thereby give his tacit
consent, and is as far forth obliged to obedience to the laws of that government, during
such enjoyment [sic], as anyone under it.”254 In perhaps the most impressive description
of human agency found in Locke’s political theory, Locke separates the individual mind
from the person’s possessions. A government has a “direct jurisdiction” over the land a
non-expressing individual “dwells upon,” but the “obligation [said individual] is under,
by virtue of such enjoyment…begins and ends with enjoyment.” Locke sums up his
argument by stating that nothing can make an individual a consenting participant of a
commonwealth unless “actually entering into it by positive engagement, and express
promise and compact.”
Similar to the time and events that took place in the days of Vermont’s early
history, it took time for some Vermonters during the early years of nationhood to accept
the absolute authority of the United States.
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